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Abstract
With the power system evolving from passive to a more active system there is
an incorporation of information and communication infrastructures in the system.
The measurement data are more prone to tampering from attackers for mala fide
intentions. Therefore, security and reliability of distribution have become major
concerns. State estimation (SE), being the core function of the energy/distribution
management system (EMS/DMS), has become necessary in order to operate the
system efficiently and in a controlled manner.
Although SE is a well-known task in transmission systems, it is usually not a
common task in unbalanced distribution systems due to the difference in design
and operation philosophy. This thesis addresses these issues and investigates the
distribution system state estimation with unbalanced full three-phase modelling.
The formulation, based on weighted least squares estimation, is extended to include
the open/closed switches as equality constraints.
This research then explores the vulnerabilities of the state estimation problem
against attacks associated with leverage measurements. Detecting gross error partic-
ularly for leverage measurements have been found to be difficult due to low residuals.
The thesis presents and discusses the suitability of externally studentized residuals
compared to traditional residual techniques.
Additionally, the masking/swamping phenomenon associated with multiple lever-
ages makes the identification of gross error even more difficult. This thesis proposes
a robust method of identifying the high leverages and then detecting gross error
when the leverage measurements are compromised. All algorithms are validated in
different IEEE test systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
Power networks all over the world are undergoing a significant scale of devel-
opment. They are gradually changing from passive systems to smart and active
systems, where the performance and flexibility of operation are improved. The ma-
jor drivers are shift of technology of generation towards renewables (mainly solar
and wind) and new forms of demand such as electric transportation, district heat-
ing etc. Due to the change of operation philosophy, the loads have become smart
and the small industrial, commercial and domestic customers can feed in energy to
the system and thus can participate in demand response functions. Therefore, this
uncertain nature of generation and new type of demand need to be dealt with by
more active energy management strategy [1]. There is an increasing adoption of
smart instrumentation such as phasor measurement units (PMUs), intelligent me-
tering etc. in transmission networks and smart meters in distribution networks with
information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure. As a result, the
integrity of data and information is exposed to risk and the power system is more
prone to malicious attacks from adversaries. Tampered data will obviously affect
the outcome of network control and computing functions such as state estimation,
security analysis, volt var control (VVC) etc.
To enable the effective control of the power network, the states of the system need
17
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to be observed properly. The energy/distribution management systems (EMS/DMS)
will play a crucial role in the control and operation of smart power systems. Central
to every EMS/DMS are two functional blocks: the state estimator and the control
scheduling block. The state estimation provides a real-time estimate of system
states, based on the measurements obtained from meters and sensors in the remote
terminal units (RTUs).
State Estimator
and Bad Data
Detection
Distribution
Optimal Power
Flow
Transmission/
Distribution
Network Operator
Power Grid
Basic EMS/DMS functions
Notify TNO/DNO
Control
set-points
State
estimates
Measurements
vector
Real
Measurements
Pseudo
Measurements
Virtual
Measurements
+
Figure 1.1: A typical energy/distribution management system (EMS/DMS) archi-
tecture
A typical energy/distribution management system architecture is shown in Fig-
ure 1.1. It shows that the control set-points for the transmission/distribution net-
work operator are decided by the states estimated from the state estimation block.
It will help the EMS/DMS to take a host of operational decisions in case of contin-
gency and cascaded tripping etc. Thus the states of the system need to be monitored
and observed effectively. Hence, state estimation has become an important and nec-
essary function of modern network operation.
The research proposed in this thesis develops the distribution state estimation on
unbalanced systems, addresses the vulnerabilities of the state estimation problem
and explores and develops a new methodology for gross error detection against
attacks from adversaries.
18
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1.2 Literature review
With growing number of controllable devices distribution system state estima-
tion is becoming popular for distribution system operation. The solution method-
ology mainly focusses on weighted weast squares (WLS) estimation technique. But
the majority of distribution systems operate under varying degrees of unbalance.
Hence, this has paved the way for the need of unbalanced three-phase state estima-
tion rather than single-phase state estimation.
1.2.1 State estimation of distribution systems
There has been growing literature in distribution system state estimation.
Many authors [2–5] have proposed branch current based state estimators for
distribution system. They take branch currents as state variables. The method is
particularly useful for radial networks. The method of branch current decouples the
state estimation problem into three sub problems, one for each phase. This makes
it computationally efficient.
To obtain a unique estimate of system states and to take care of the measurement
errors it is required to have the number of measurements larger than the number of
states. This is called redundancy. Due to their large and radial nature distribution
systems are not metered properly. Due to the lack of this measurement redundancy
in the distribution network, the zero-injection nodes are considered as zero-injection
measurements. Lin and Teng [6] proposed the method of Lagrange multipliers to
incorporate the zero-injections and proposed a current-based decoupled SE based
on rectangular co-ordinates methodology to solve the problem.
Baran [7] mentioned that the SE results can improve the forecasted load data by
using real-time measurements. However, when there are limited real measurements
the accuracy of SE depends on the accuracy of the forecasted load data. It is
proposed that state estimation can be used to improve the data needed for real-time
monitoring of distribution systems.
Lin et al. [3] devised an efficient method for treating the current magnitude
19
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measurements into equivalent current phasors. The constant gain matrix and a
decoupled form for current measurements developed here produced a robust and
efficient solution. It also needs minimal storage requirement due to the constant
gain matrix. Wang and Schulz [4] discussed the decoupling in case of branch current
state estimation and about the impact of branch power flow, current magnitude and
voltage measurements on the accuracy of SE results.
Li [8] has presented a distribution system state estimation based on the WLS
approach and three phase modelling techniques. Several factors such as load error
correlation, pseudo measurement errors, location of real-time meters, accurate load
measurements improve the state estimates.
Wang and others in [5] studied the state estimation based on branch currents
when the different types of DGs are added such as PQ-type, PV-type, PI-type and
PQV-type and discussed the impact on accuracy of SE on location and size of DGs.
The DGs were treated as real-time measurements and the state estimates were found
to be closer to the true value compared to the state estimates without DGs.
Lu and others [9] have proposed a three-phase current based estimator that
sought to minimise the WLS objective. The advantage of having a constant gain
matrix was achieved through minimal storage requirement and less computational
time. Here, power, current and voltage measurements are converted to their equiv-
alent currents, and as a result the Jacobian terms are constant and equal to the
admittance matrix elements.
Baran and Kelley [2] have introduced an algorithm that takes branch currents
as state variables. This method is very efficient and works well in radial distribu-
tion systems. A better computation speed and filtering properties without losing
accuracy were achieved through feeder reduction method.
Due to lack of measurements the load demands in the distribution system are
taken from historical load forecast data or load curves. This creates sufficient un-
certainty. A probabilistic approach to DSSE based on the probabilistic radial flow
algorithm is proposed in [10] by Ghosh and others. This algorithm also takes into
account the non-normality of states, radial nature of the system, low ratio of real-
time measurements to states and the load diversity. The effects of load correlation
20
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and confidence interval were also discussed.
Lubkeman et al [11] presented the distribution system SE on a field circuit and
proved that the state estimation algorithm is viable on practical systems. The state
estimates were found to give improved solutions over load flows.
With gradual deployment of phasor measurement units (PMUs) in networks the
state estimation process is also changing. With this development the measurement
system is gradually changing to a phasor-only system. Jones [12] have mentioned
a three-phase linear state estimation with synchronised phasor measurements and
applied on a practical system.
The distribution system operates under various degrees of unbalance. This cou-
pled with topological uncertainties has an impact on the accuracy of state estimates.
References [13–16] have demonstrated this. The full system modelling allows the
detection of dangerous imbalances and better estimation of current operating point.
It can also have better bad data rejection capability. Zero injection is taken as
constraints in the nodes having no generation, load and measurement.
PMUs and smart meters are being incorporated into the modern distribution
network. A full three-phase linear estimator based on PMU and smart meter mea-
surements is proposed by Haughton and Heydt in [17]. The linear estimator produces
better estimates and thus would help in decision making of distribution systems.
Thukaram and others [18] at first ensured the observability of the network by
graph theory and then used a robust forward-backward propagation method based
on nodal current injections to obtain the state estimates.
1.2.2 Bad data detection methodology
However, with the advent of deregulation in the power network and the intro-
duction of distributed generations (DG) and smart meters [19,20], having an efficient
and accurate state estimate is becoming more and more necessary.
With such integration of distributed generations and ICT infrastructure, the
future smart power grid is no longer a physical system only but rather a cyber-
physical system [21–23]. It has been argued in [21] that an adversary can inject
21
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malicious data into the system without being detected by classical bad data detection
techniques. In the case that the adversary performs an unobservable attack, which
cannot be detected by classical bad data detection techniques, it is important to
know how vulnerable the power system operation is to these attacks. The sparse
attack vector can be designed by an adversary by controlling enough meters.
Smart meters with their two-way data and communication flow are easily prone
to attacks from adversaries [24, 25]. Reference [24] further explains different types
of attack that can be synthesized in relation to strong and weak attack regimes.
The unobservable attacks exist in case of strong attack regime while in case of weak
attack regime the gross errors can be detected by generalized likelihood ratio test
and minimum mean squares estimator.
Reference [25] illustrates the strategies for malicious attacks to be incorporated
such as unobservable attacks, minimum size unobservable attacks and minimum
residue energy attacks and henceforth, uses the concept of generalized likelihood
ratio test (GLRT) to detect the gross error with L1 norm regularization.
The issue of bad data detection has been addressed in the literature as in [26,27]
by the χ2 distribution and χ2-test. Many people [26, 27] have used the largest
normalized residuals (LNR) to detect bad data in single bad data environment or
in case of multiple non-interacting bad data.
The authors in [28] and [29] have demonstrated further the impact of inaccurate
parameters and untransposed lines not only on the accuracy of the estimated quan-
tities but on the bad data rejection capability as well. This led to the requirement
of synchronised phasor measurements at the distribution level.
Many authors [30] have presented the identification procedure of leverage mea-
surements by various distance measures like Mahalanabis distance and by Projection
Statistics [31]. [30] argues that with projection statistics the state estimation results
are much closer to load flow results than without projection statistics. Mili et al. [31]
used a Schweppe-Huber type generalized estimator based on projection statistics,
which is a simple modification of WLS estimator.
In recent years, there have been growing interests in the false data injection to
power system and dealing with those attacks and the vulnerabilities [24, 25, 32–34].
22
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW Chapter 1
The basic idea of false data injection attack is to add a non-zero attack vector into
the measurements [24]. It has been reported in the literature [24, 25, 32–34] how
an adversary can synthesize an attack vector just to bypass the normalized residual
test in the dc state estimator.
Chen and Abur [35] have proposed the placement of phasor measurement units
(PMUs) for the detection of bad data. It has been proposed that minimising the
number of strategically placed PMUs will improve system observability by eliminat-
ing criticality of measurements and thus improve bad data detection.
Narvaez and others [36] have presented the concept of robust distances to detect
the difference between good and bad leverage measurements. They argued that
a robust estimator has better performance than the WLS estimator even in the
presence of bad data and bad leverage points.
Khwanram and others [37] have used Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) to
detect multiple bad data in state estimation. They used the PSO to minimize the
number of bad data while maintaining the measurement redundancy. They, however,
argued that the parameters of the technique need to be selected efficiently to reach
a global optimum solution.
Qingyu Yang and others [32] have considered the bad data in measurements as
injection of bad data and proposed the method of false data injection attacks on
state estimation. It reports how to optimize the number of measurements to be
tampered in order to compromise a given number of state variables.
Suzhi Bi and Yin Jun Zhang [33] have elucidated the defensive mechanism pro-
cedures against false data injection attacks in the state estimation. They have
proposed a greedy algorithm which produces optimal solution for the sequential
protection of state estimation against the malicious tampering. They also report
that the optimal algorithm has less computational complexity compared to the sub-
optimal algorithm.
Liu, Ning and Reiter [38] have summarised the concept of false data injection
attacks against state estimation in electric power grid. They have discussed the
different types of false data injection attacks in terms of two scenarios - access to
meters and access to resources. They have also reported the impacts of these two
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scenarios on state estimates when the meters or state variables are targeted.
Lin and Pan [39] have explained a static state estimation approach regarding bad
data detection and identification. They employ a modified covariance matrix and
reduce the effect of bad data on state estimates. In addition to that they proposed
a gap statistic method to identify bad measurements.
Tarali in [40] have presented a bad data detection technique in two-stage state
estimation using phasor measurements. The conventional state estimates from the
first stage are used with PMU measurements in the second stage to get the new
estimates. The PMU measurements will improve the system observability and thus
help in bad data detection.
Hug and Giampapa [34] show how a false data injection attack at the RTU level
can be hidden by tampering with a number of measurement data and they assess
the vulnerability associated with this threat in terms of number of measurements to
be attacked.
However, none of [24, 25, 32–34] have addressed the situation when a particular
influential or leverage measurement is compromised. Hence, this provides the basis
to have an identification procedure against such an unobservable attack.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
Following the introduction and literature review, the thesis is organised as fol-
lows:
Chapter 2 points out the difference between transmission systems and distribu-
tion systems. It provides a detailed modelling of various components of three-phase
systems such as lines, transformers, switches and loads. It further describes the
three-phase test systems used in this research.
Chapter 3 provides a generic formulation for three-phase state estimation. The
technique based on weighted least squares estimation has been discussed in detail.
The results and simulations on different test systems have been illustrated for various
switch configurations also. The results for a part of this chapter have been published
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in [41].
Chapter 4 discusses the different diagnostic techniques for the detection of gross
error. It also compares the different residual techniques and the robust estimation
techniques. It introduces the concepts of internally and externally studentized resid-
uals and discusses their effectiveness in detecting bad data.
Chapter 5 proposes a technique for bad data detection when the leverage mea-
surement points are attacked by an adversary. The mathematical formulation of the
technique has been discussed in detail. The proposed technique has also been com-
pared with the traditional detection techniques and the advantages of the method
have been justified. The results of this chapter have been submitted for publica-
tion [42] and is currently under review. This was first submitted on December 2014.
Chapter 6 recapitulates the contributions of this thesis and presents a brief
overview of future research directions.
1.4 Contributions of the thesis
The contributions of this research can be summarised as follows:
• The distribution system state estimation literature is mainly focused on bal-
anced system architecture. This thesis discusses the necessity of unbalanced
system component modelling, develops the detailed modelling of three-phase
unbalanced systems and discusses the advantages.
• A robust three-phase unbalanced state estimation model is presented. The
thesis investigates the suitability of three-phase SE on different load types,
transformer connections and switch configurations. It also investigates the
existing transmission system state estimation techniques and assesses their
suitability to unbalance distribution system. The extended modelling of 13-
bus and 123-bus has been carried out and the DSSE is implemented on these
standard distribution systems.
• The thesis studies the possible vulnerabilities of SE in detail. It also introduces
and discusses the suitability of externally studentized residuals, a technique
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used in statistics for outlier detection, in power system bad detection for the
first time.
• Due to the integration of intelligent and smart metering and communication
infrastructures, the modern power system is becoming more and more vul-
nerable. The vulnerabilities in regards to leverage measurements have not
been properly addressed before. This research proposes and develops a new
technique to identify the gross error in case of leverage measurements and
discusses the advantages of the technique. It has been tested on 14-bus and
123-bus systems.
1.4.1 Contributions to other thesis/research
This thesis’s extensive three-phase modelling framework has been used in other
PhD thesis/research as detailed below.
• The exhaustive three-phase modelling of distribution systems has led to par-
allel contributions in a thesis in the group which explores and investigates
the estimation of discrete transformer taps in distribution systems by hybrid
particle swarm optimization and then by ordinal optimization. The ordinal
optimization has the capability of providing the accurate tap estimation in
less computation time and at the same time has the ability of handling huge
computational complexity. This has led to publications [43,44] and one paper
submitted for publication [45]. The development of ordinal optimization for
three-phase state estimation has enabled us to form a strong background for
the detection of discrete transformer tap error which is under process.
• The three-phase modelling framework has also benefited a research on prob-
abilistic operation of three-phase distribution network in collaboration with a
lecturer at University of Bradford. It explores the uncertain operation of un-
balanced distribution systems with increased solar input under active network
management schemes of coordinated voltage control and power factor control.
This has led to one publication [46].
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Chapter 2
Modelling of Three Phase Unbal-
anced System
The electric power distribution system is the final stage of electric power system.
It is connected to the transmission system at the distribution substation. The
substation transformers lower the transmission voltage to medium or low voltage.
The distribution system carries the power to the distribution transformers. The
distribution transformers lower the voltage level further to carry the electric power
to customer premises. The distribution system consists of unsymmetrical network
components and unbalanced load. The distribution system can be unbalanced due to
many reasons: The loads connected may single phase loads such as the lighting loads
or single phase induction motors. Although the distribution systems are designed as
balanced statistically the distribution system may be unbalanced due to the presence
of different laterals drawing different currents. Hence, the single line representation
for an unbalanced distribution system is not appropriate. Therefore, the full three-
phase modelling of the network components is necessary.
Over the years, there has been significant research on three-phase load flow
in distribution systems [47]. However, most of the operational i.e., control and
contingency, decisions based on state estimation have been applied to distribution
systems assumed to be balanced [48]. Moreover, the loads considered are constant
power and Y-connected loads and the different status (closed/open) of the switches
28
2.1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TSSE AND DSSE Chapter 2
are not considered [9,18]. The following sections describe the three phase modelling
of various components of the network such as line, transformers, switches and loads.
2.1 Difference between transmission system and
distribution system state estimation
The design and topology of distribution systems are quite different from trans-
mission systems. The distribution system is typically characterised by unbalanced
systems, shorter lines with high R/X ratios and hence suffers more losses compared
to a transmission network. The distribution system is usually spread over a large
geographical area and is radial in nature. As a result, many consumer or domestic
loads remain unmeasured and a large portion of the network remains unmonitored.
This poses a serious challenge to the observability of the network and the state
estimator module to provide reasonable estimates. Therefore, the planning and
operation of distribution system(s) is different from transmission systems.
The methodologies adopted in the transmission systems cannot be duplicated
in the distribution system. Since a large portion of the distribution system is un-
measured the system is underdetermined. To overcome this difficulty the unmea-
sured/unmetered loads are treated as pseudo measurements and their measurements
are derived from typical load curves, historical data of the feeders and transformer
loadings. These pseudo measurements will have more uncertainties associated with
them compared to that of real measured data. Although recently automated me-
tering infrastructure (AMI) have come into the picture it is still not practical to
install AMRs in every location. There are actually more pseudo measurements than
real measurements in the distribution system state estimation (DSSE). Since the
R/X ratio is high the decoupling of state estimation problem into P − δ and Q−V
equations is not possible. The distribution system is more prone to unbalances due
to 1-ph and 3-ph loads and due to the presence of 1-ph, 2-ph and 3-ph laterals.
Moreover,being large,the distribution system is prone to unbalance faults and these
can also create unbalance in the system.
29
2.2. THREE-PHASE LINE MODELLING Chapter 2
This sets up the motivation to explore and develop the robust three phase state
estimation on unbalanced systems.
2.2 Three-phase line modelling
The distribution system consists of untransposed overhead lines and under-
ground cables which can be three-phase or single and/or two-phase laterals. Figure
2.2 shows a three-phase distribution system with single and two phase laterals. This
combined with the unbalanced loads (single, two or three-phase loads) contribute to
the unbalanced nature of the system. Due to the untransposed nature of the lines,
the single phase/line representation of lines does not work. Thus, it is essential to
compute the impedance of the lines accurately. A modified Carson’s equation is
applied to compute the self and mutual impedance of the lines [49].
Zii = ri + 0.095 + j0.121×
(
ln
1
GMRi
+ 7.934
)
Ω/mile (2.1)
Zij = 0.095 + j0.121×
(
ln
1
Dij
+ 7.934
)
Ω/mile (2.2)
Where,
Zii Self-impedance of conductor i in Ω/mile.
Zij Mutual impedance between conductors i and j in Ω/mile.
ri Resistance of conductor i in Ω/mile.
GMRi Geometric mean radius of conductor i in feet.
Dij Distance between conductors i and j in feet.
The modified Carson’s equation also takes into account the ground return path
(neutral conductor) for the unbalanced currents.
The modified Carson’s equations (2.1) and (2.2) for a three phase overhead or
underground circuit which consists of neut neutral conductors forces the resulting
impedance matrix (3 + neut) × (3 + neut). However, for most applications, it is
necessary to have the 3×3 phase impedance matrix. Therefore, (3+neut)×(3+neut)
impedance matrix is broken down to 3 × 3 matrices by Kron’s reduction as given
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in (2.3). In this approach, all the lines will be modelled by 3 × 3 phase impedance
matrices and for two phase and single phase lines the missing phases are modelled
by setting the impedance element to zero.
Zij,abc = [Zij]− Zineut[Zneutneut]−1Zneutj (2.3)
Where,
Zij,abc Phase-impedance matrix.
Zineut Mutual impedance matrix between conductor i and neut neutral conduc-
tors in Ω/mile.
Zneutneut Self-impedance matrix of neut neutral conductors in Ω/mile.
Zneutj Mutual impedance matrix between neut neutral conductors and conductor
j in Ω/mile.
Therefore, for each line between two nodes, there will be a 3 × 3 matrix instead
of a single element for a single phase balanced system. Hence, the resultant Y -bus
matrix of the system will be of (n× 3)× (n× 3). The structure of the Y -bus matrix
is shown in (2.4).
Y =


Y aa11 Y
ab
11 Y
ac
11 · · · Y aa1n Y ab1n Y ac1n
Y ba11 Y
bb
11 Y
bc
11 · · · Y ba1n Y bb1n Y bc1n
Y ca11 Y
cb
11 Y
cc
11 · · · Y ca1n Y cb1n Y cc1n
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
Y aan1 Y
ab
n1 Y
ac
n1 · · · Y aann Y abnn Y acnn
Y ban1 Y
bb
n1 Y
bc
n1 · · · Y bann Y bbnn Y bcnn
Y can1 Y
cb
n1 Y
cc
n1 · · · Y cann Y cbnn Y ccnn


(2.4)
2.3 Transformer modelling
The distribution system generally consists of feeder and distribution transform-
ers which provide the final voltage transformation to the loads. The three phase
transformers are modeled by an admittance matrix which depends on the connection
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type. A transformer can be Y-Y, Y-∆, ∆-∆. In balanced systems, the transform-
ers are modelled as single phase leakage impedances. Thus the single phase/line
representation will work perfectly fine. However, in the analysis of the distribution
feeder for three phase, it is required to model the various three phase transformer
connections correctly. The comprehensive calculations of three phase transformers
and their various connections can be found in references [49,50]. While forming the
Y -bus, a transformer can be considered as one element between two nodes of the
system. Therefore, the transformer contributes to a 6 × 6 block in the Y -matrix.
The transformer nodal admittance matrix can be calculated from the current-voltage
relationship of transformer, which is given by
Iabcp
Iabcs

 =

Y abcpp Y abcps
Y abcsp Y
abc
ss



V abcp
V abcs

 (2.5)
where,
Iabcp , V
abc
p are the primary side current and line-to-neutral voltage vectors for the
three phases.
Iabcs , V
abc
s are the secondary side current and line-to-neutral voltage vectors for the
three phases.
The nodal admittance matrix is formed of the sub-matrices Y abcpp , Y
abc
ps , Y
abc
sp and
Y abcss . Depending on the connection of three phase transformers on the primary and
secondary sides the sub-matrices Y abcpp , Y
abc
ps , Y
abc
sp and Y
abc
ss will vary. Thus the nodal
admittance matrix for the transformers will change as explained in [50]. The nodal
admittance matrix also depends on whether the transformer connection is step-up
or step-down. The nodal admittance matrix components for some of the connections
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Table 2.1: Nodal admittance matrix for step-down transformers
Primary Secondary Yabcpp Y
abc
ss Y
abc
ps Y
abc
sp
Yg Yg YI YI -YI -YI
Yg ∆ YI YII YIII Y
T
III
Y ∆ YII YII YIII Y
T
III
∆ ∆ YII YII -YII -YII
Yg Y YII YII -YII -YII
Y Yg YII YII -YII -YII
Y Y YII YII -YII -YII
∆ Yg YII YI YIII Y
T
III
∆ Y YII YII YIII Y
T
III
of step-down transformer are shown in Table 2.1. where,
YI =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 yt (2.6)
YII =
1
3


2 −1 −1
−1 2 −1
−1 −1 2

 yt (2.7)
YIII =
1√
3


−1 1 0
0 −1 1
1 0 −1

 yt (2.8)
where yt is the transformer leakage impedance in per unit.
2.4 Switch modelling
Switches are considered as branches with zero impedance. It is assumed that the
status of the switches, i.e. closed or open, are known beforehand. The operational
constraints for the switches are considered as equality constraints as given by ceq = 0
in equation (3.18) of the original problem formulation. This is described in detail in
Section 3.3.
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• When the switch between bus i and bus j is assumed closed for branch i-j, the
voltages and angles for bus i and bus j and phase ph for all the three phases
are equal.
V phi − V phj = 0
δphi − δphj = 0
(2.9)
• When the switch is assumed open between bus i and bus j, the active and
reactive power flow to the switch will be zero.
P phij = 0
Qphij = 0
(2.10)
2.5 Load modelling
The loads in distribution systems are generally unbalanced. The loads are three-
phase, two-phase or single-phase. They can be connected in grounded Y or un-
grounded ∆ configuration. From the point of view of electricity usage, loads can be
broadly classified as constant power, constant impedance or constant current loads.
They are commonly represented as power consumed per phase and considered to be
line-to-neutral for Y-loads and line-to-line for ∆-loads. The typical ZIP models for
Y and ∆ loads are shown in (2.11) and (2.13).
P phL = P
ph
n
[
cP1 + c
P
2
(
V ph
Vn
)
+ cP3
(
V ph
Vn
)2]
(2.11)
QphL = Q
ph
n
[
cQ1 + c
Q
2
(
V ph
Vn
)
+ cQ3
(
V ph
Vn
)2]
(2.12)
P ph12L = P
ph12
n
[
cP1 + c
P
2
(
V ph12√
3Vn
)
+ cP3
(
V ph12√
3Vn
)2]
(2.13)
Qph12L = Q
ph12
n
[
cQ1 + c
Q
2
(
V ph12√
3Vn
)
+ cQ3
(
V ph12√
3Vn
)2]
(2.14)
Where, ph12 = ab, bc, ca.
34
2.5. LOAD MODELLING Chapter 2
aI
cI
bI
abI
bcI
caI
abV ca
V
bcV
Figure 2.1: Delta-connected three-phase load
Figure 2.1 shows a typical ∆-connected three phase load. The voltage magni-
tudes are line-to-neutral for the state estimation formulation, which is discussed in
the next chapter. Therefore, in case of delta loads, the equivalent wye powers are
calculated at each iteration in order to calculate the active and reactive power at
each node. This is illustrated in the following steps.
• Calculate line-to-neutral voltage for ∆ loads

V abi
V bci
V cai

 =


V ai ∠δ
a
i − V bi ∠δbi
V bi ∠δ
b
i − V ci ∠δci
V ci ∠δ
c
i − V ai ∠δai

 (2.15)
• Read the active and reactive power of ∆ loads
• Calculate the line currents of ∆ loads
Iab =
(
Pab + jQab
Vab∠δab
)∗
(2.16)
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• Calculate the current at each phase

Ia
Ib
Ic

 =


1 0 −1
−1 1 0
0 −1 1




Iab
Ibc
Ica

 (2.17)
• Calculate the equivalent line-to-neutral active and reactive powers
VaI
∗
a = Pa + jQa
VbI
∗
b = Pb + jQb
VcI
∗
c = Pc + jQc
(2.18)
For the phases where the loads are non-existent, the active and reactive power
values are set to zero for those particular phases.
2.6 Measurements
The distribution system normally covers a large geographical area. Hence, it
is not possible to place meters at all nodes and lines. Hence, the redundancy of
distribution systems is usually far less than that of transmission systems. However,
it is required to make the system observable in order to solve the state estimation.
With a given set of measurements the system is said to be observable if a unique
estimate of the states can be found. For the system to be observable the number
of measurements should be more than the number of state variables. The graph
theory method has been carried out to ensure the observability of the network.
Therefore, the load data taken from historical load data profiles are taken as pseudo
measurements and zero-injection buses are considered as virtual measurements.
2.6.1 Load flow calculation
In general, current-injection or interior point based three-phase load flow is
performed to generate the input to state estimation. These are taken as true values
for measurements. Gaussian distributed random noise components are added to
these true values to generate the measurements. The real measurements are assumed
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to have 1%-3% error while the pseudo measurements are assumed to be of 20%-50%
error. The variances of the measurement error are then calculated based on equation
(3.12) as explained in the next chapter. However, the zero-injections or the virtual
measurements and the switches are taken as equality constraints. This calculation
is described in detail in the next chapter.
2.7 Test systems
The standard IEEE test systems of 13-bus and 123-bus have been studied. The
SE algorithms in this thesis have been tested on these systems. The system data
are taken from [51] and [52]. The characteristics of the systems are detailed below.
2.7.1 IEEE 13-bus system
2
3
4
1
6
5
10
117
8
9
13
12
Figure 2.2: IEEE-13 bus unbalanced distribution system
The feeders are small yet they show some interesting characteristics. Figure 2.2
shows the system.
• Short and relatively high loaded for a 4.16 kV feeder.
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• One substation voltage regulator consisting of three single phase units connected
in Y.
• Both overhead and underground lines are present with a variety of phasing.
• It has shunt capacitors.
• It has one transformer: grounded Y-grounded Y
• Unbalanced spot and distributed loads are present.
• The loads are of constant power, constant current and constant impedance type
and are Y and/or ∆ connected.
The complete system data is given in Appendix A.
2.7.2 IEEE 123-bus system
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Figure 2.3: IEEE 123 bus system
The system test feeder has a nominal voltage of 4.16 kV and the system has
some remarkable features. The system is shown in Figure 2.3.
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• The system consists of overhead and underground lines.
• The system is unbalanced due to the presence of single, double or three phas-
ing and unbalanced loads with constant power, constant current and current
impedance types.
• There are spot loads only.
• Switching options to allow alternate ways of power flow.
• There are four tap tranformers present.
The complete system data has been provided in Appendix B.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents in detail the three-phase modelling of various components
such as distribution lines, transformers, switches and three-phase loads. The stan-
dard IEEE distribution systems like IEEE-13 bus and IEEE-123 systems have been
discussed in detail. The systems contain all types of ZIP loads. The capacitors
are considered as constant impedance loads, which are voltage dependent. The
next chapter describes the state estimation formulation based on this unbalanced
three-phase modelling.
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Chapter 3
State Estimation of Unbalanced Dis-
tribution Systems
With the influx of phasor measurement units (PMUs), intelligent metering etc.
in transmission systems and smart meters with information and communication
technology (ICT) infrastructure in distribution systems, power systems now-a-days
need to be monitored and controlled efficiently. To enable this, the states of the
system need to be observed properly. This would help to influence the operational
decisions and thus, to avoid contingency and cascaded tripping. It is done through
an energy/ distribution management system (EMS/DMS) function- the state esti-
mation (SE) [20, 53]. Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 elucidates the importance of state
estimation function in the transmission or distribution network operation. This
function estimates the bus voltages and angles based on the available measurements,
network data and topology information obtained from the supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) system.
In transmission systems, the state estimation concept is well established but in
distribution systems due to the absence of sufficient measurements and unbalanced
and asymmetric nature of the system, it was not mandatory to have a state estima-
tion function as it involves significant complexity and computational time. But with
growing number of controllable devices and the incorporation of smart meters in the
system, state estimation is becoming important in distribution network operation.
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Unlike the transmission system, the majority of distribution systems operate
under varying degrees of unbalance. Moreover, the distribution system is radial in
nature and has a higher R/X ratio. Therefore, the fast decoupled method causes
numerical instability when applied to distribution systems [26]. Hence, this has
paved the way for the need of unbalanced three-phase state estimation rather than
single-phase state estimation.
To achieve accurate estimates of the state variables, this chapter presents a
weighted least squares based estimator with the detailed modelling of the system
components and different types of loads and also considering the different operational
status of the switches in Section 3.3.
3.1 Overview of State Estimation
State estimation (SE) is a process of determining the states (voltage magnitudes
and angles) of the network based on the available measurements and network topol-
ogy information and parameter data. The measurements are prone to errors. The
SE processes a set of redundant measurements and finds out the most optimal state
of the system and thus takes care of the errors.
3.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The state estimation methodology determines the most likely states of the sys-
tem based on the measurements available in the system. In statistics, maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) is a method of estimating the parameters (or states) of
a statistical model. For example, for a normal distribution, the parameters (mean
and variance) are estimated with MLE from the knowledge of some sample data.
The MLE selects the values of the parameters by maximising the given likelihood
function. Here, in state estimation context, the measurement errors are generally as-
sumed to follow a normal distribution. The joint probability density function (pdf)
of all the measurements are formed and hence, an optimisation problem is solved to
maximise the likelihood function.
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Let x denote the state vector, comprising voltage magnitudes and angles. The
non-linear measurement model relating the state vector and measurement vector
zmeas = [z1 z2 ... zm]
T can be written as
zmeas = hfunc(x) + e (3.1)
where e ∽ N(0, R) is a zero mean Gaussian noise with measurement error covariance
matrix R. hfunc(x) is a vector of measurement functions. Equation (3.1) relates the
state variables x to the measurement vector zmeas. Considering all the measurements
to be independently and identically distributed, the joint pdf is a product of the
individual pdfs of all the measurements.
f (zmeas|x) = f (z1)f (z2) . . . f (zm) (3.2)
The function given in equation (3.2) is the maximum likelihood function. The MLE
maximises this likelihood function to get the maximum-likelihood estimate xˆ.
To simplify the optimization process the logarithm of the likelihood function is
taken rather than only the likelihood function. Since log is a monotonically increas-
ing function, maximizing the log-likelihood function is equivalent to maximizing the
likelihood function. Therefore, from a power system perspective, the MLE can be
defined as minimizing the negative of log-likelihood function
minimize : −log(f (zmeas|x)) (3.3)
3.2.1 Generic Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Estimation
If we consider zmeas to be normally distributed,
f (zmeas|x) = 1√
(2pi)mdetR
e−
1
2
(zmeas−hfunc(x))
TR−1(zmeas−hfunc(x)) (3.4)
The equation ((3.3)) can be written as
minimize : −
m∑
i=1
log(f (zi)) (3.5)
minimize :
1
2
m∑
i=1
(
zi − µi
σi
)2 +
m
2
ln(2π) +
m∑
i=1
ln σi (3.6)
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which is equivalent to minimizing the first term of equation (3.6), where µi is the
expected value E(zi) and σ
2
i is the variance of measurement error in zi. The first
term in equation 3.6 can be interpreted as squares of measurement errors (zi − µi)
weighted by σ−2i . Hence, this state estimation is also called as Weighted Least
Square (WLS) state estimation. The minimization problem can be rewritten as:
minimize
x
: J = (zmeas − hfunc(x))TR−1(zmeas − hfunc(x)) (3.7)
The solution to this above problem can be solved by Newton’s method. The details of
the solution is discussed below. Here, R = Cov(e) = E(eeT) = diag(σ21, σ
2
2, . . . , σ
2
m)
is defined as the error covariance matrix, where ei = zi − hi(x) is the error in the
measurement and σ2i is the variance of the i
th measurement.
To minimize the cost function in equation (3.7), the first-order derivatives should
equate to zero. Hence, the first-order optimality condition can be written as
gderv(x) =
∂J
∂x
= −HT (x)R−1(zmeas − hfunc(x)) = 0 (3.8)
Since, gderv(x) is a non-linear function, equation (3.8) can be solved by numerical
methods only. Thus, the Taylor’s series expansion of gderv around the state variable
vector xk gives
gderv(x) = gderv(x
k)+
∂gderv(x
k)
∂x
(x−xk)T+ 1
2!
∂2gderv(x
k)
∂x2
((x−xk)2)T+. . . = 0 (3.9)
Neglecting the terms for 2nd and higher order derivatives, the above equation (an
over-determined system) is solved by Gauss-Newton’s method.
xk+1 = xk − [G(xk)]−1gderv(xk) (3.10)
So at each iteration, this results in solving the following equation
[G(xk)]∆xk+1 = HT (xk)R−1[zmeas − hfunc(xk)] (3.11)
where, in the kth iteration,
∆xk+1 = xk+1 − xk
H(xk) = [
∂hfunc
∂x
]xk is the Jacobian matrix
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G(xk) =∂gderv(x
k)
∂x
= HT (xk)R−1H(xk) is the Gain matrix.
The measurement function can be created by having the network data and the
telemetered measurements. The network data includes the information about the
network topology, network parameters, transformer parameters and the loads. The
required measurements for the state estimation can be classified under three broad
categories:
• Actual Measurements: These are telemetered measurements which include volt-
age magnitudes, power injections, line currents and real and reactive power flows.
The accuracy of these measurements depend on the accuracy of their meters.
• Pseudo Measurements: In the distribution system due to the large size of the
system, it is very difficult to have load measurements at each and every bus.
Hence, the loads are estimated based on previous load profile data with high
variance of error.
• Virtual Measurements: Zero injections are considered as measurements with zero
power injections. The zero injections are included in the measurement vector to
improve the measurement redundancy and thus the observability of the network.
One knows with more certainty the measurement values for the zero injection
measurements. Hence, these measurements will have higher weights or very low
variance.
The weights associated with real measurements, pseudo measurements and virtual
measurements are different. In fact, the weight associated with each measurement is
different. As the errors have been assumed to obey normal probability distribution
the standard deviation of the errors can be computed as
σi =
µi ×%error
3× 100 (3.12)
where, µi is taken as the true value and it is assumed that a ±3σ deviation around
the mean according to the property of normal distribution as shown in Figure 3.1.
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µ µ+σ µ+2σ µ+3σµ−σµ−2σµ−3σ
Figure3.1:ANormalDistributionCurve
EqualityConstrainedAugmented MatrixApproach
Thevarianceassociatedwithvirtualmeasurementssuchaszeroinjectionsare
verylow,whereasvarianceassociatedwithpseudomeasurementsareveryhigh.
Thismayleadtoil-conditioningoftheGainmatrix.So,toavoidthis,thestate
estimationproblemcanbeformulatedasaconstrainedoptimizationproblem.
minimizex :J=
1
2r
TR−1r (3.13)
subjectto:
ceq(x)=0
r−zmeas+hfunc(x)=0
risthevectorofresidualstakenasexplicitvariables.Thevirtualmeasurementsand
theopen/closedoperationalconstraintsoftheswitchesareconsideredasequality
constraints. Thesehavebeenexplainedinthenextsection. TheresultingLa-
grangianwilhavetwosetsofLagrangemultipliers:
L=J−λTceq(x)−µT(r−zmeas+hfunc(x)) (3.14)
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Linearising the normal equations, the following system of equations are obtained:

R H 0
HT 0 CT
0 C 0




µ
∆x
λ

 =


∆zkmeas
0
−ceq(xk)

 (3.15)
The coefficient matrix in equation (3.15) is called the Hachtel’s matrix. Since the
Hachtel’s matrix is very sparse, solving the above enlarged system is not particularly
expensive. However, the condition number of the Hachtel’s matrix can be improved
by scaling the residual matrix or in other words, by multiplying α−1, where α is a
scalar, to the co-variance matrix R in the Hachtel’s matrix [27]. This results in the
new Hachtel’s matrix, which is given by

α−1R H 0
HT 0 CT
0 C 0




µ
∆x
λ

 =


∆zkmeas
0
−ceq(xk)

 (3.16)
3.3 Mathematical modelling of unbalanced distri-
bution system state estimation
3.3.1 Problem Formulation for distribution systems
The state estimation is a process which estimates real-time states of the system
(voltage magnitudes and angles). The transmission system is, however, a special
case of unbalanced system where, the system is balanced and hence, the number of
state variables and equations are reduced. The problem for three phase unbalanced
system can be looked at as a constrained non-linear optimization problem with the
following objective function
J = [zmeas − hfunc(x)]TR−1[zmeas − hfunc(x)] (3.17)
Subject to:
ceq (x) = 0 (3.18)
cineq (x) ≤ 0 (3.19)
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Where,
x State variables such as voltage magnitudes and angles.
m Number of measurements per phase.
R Measurement error covariance matrix,
zmeas =
[
za1 z
b
1 z
c
1 . . . z
a
i z
b
i z
c
i . . . z
a
m z
b
m z
c
m
]T
.
za,b,ci Measured value of i
th measurement.
hfunc(x) vector of measurement as a function of state x
ceq(x) vector of zero injection measurements and switch operational constraints.
cineq(x) vector of inequality constraints.
In three phase system
x =
[
δph1 · · · δphi · · · δphn V ph1 · · · V phi · · ·V phn
]⊤
,
where,
V phi =


V ai
V bi
V ci

, δphi =


δai
δbi
δci


are the three-phase voltage magnitude and voltage angle at bus i respectively.
The measurements are usually considered subject to random errors due to biases,
drifts or wrong connections of the measurement devices, i.e. meters. It is assumed
that the measurement errors are identically and independently distributed. Hence,
the covariance matrix of the errors is given by
R=Cov(e)=E(eeT)=diag(σ21, . . . σ
2
i , . . . , σ
2
m), where σ
2
i =
[
(σai )
2 (σbi )
2 (σci )
2
]⊤
and σ2i is the variance of the i
th measurement error.
In three-phase system, the real power injection P phi and reactive power injection
Qphi equations at bus i for phase ph can be written as:
P phi = V
ph
i
3∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
V lj
[
Gph,lij cos
(
δphi − δlj
)
+Bph,lij sin
(
δphi − δlj
)]
(3.20)
Qphi = V
ph
i
3∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
V lj
[
Gph,lij sin
(
δphi − δlj
)
−Bph,lij cos
(
δphi − δlj
)]
(3.21)
47
3.3. MATHEMATICAL MODELLING OF UNBALANCED DSSE Chapter 3
Where G + jB is the system admittance matrix, n is number of buses and l is the
number of phases that can be 1, 2 or 3 phase. The branch real power flow P phij and
reactive power flow Qphij equations from bus i to bus j for phase ph can be written
as follows:
P phij = V
ph
i
3∑
l=1
V li
[
Gph,lij cos
(
δphi − δli
)
+ Bph,lij sin
(
δphi − δli
)]
− V phi
3∑
l=1
V lj
[
Gph,lij cos
(
δphi − δlj
)
+ Bph,lij sin
(
δphi − δlj
)]
(3.22)
Qphij = −V phi
3∑
l=1
V li
[
Gph,lij sin
(
δphi − δli
)
−Bph,lij cos
(
δphi − δli
)]
− V phi
3∑
l=1
V lj
[
Gph,lij sin
(
δphi − δlj
)
−Bph,lij cos
(
δphi − δlj
)]
(3.23)
Where,
V li Voltage magnitude of phase l at bus i.
δli Angle of phase l in bus i.
3.3.2 Equality constraints ceq (x)
The equality constraints are the set of equations corresponding to virtual mea-
surements.
0 = P phGi − P phDi = P phi (3.24)
0 = QphGi −QphDi = Qphi (3.25)
Where P phGi and Q
ph
Gi are the real and reactive power injected at bus i respectively,
the load demand at the same bus is represented by P phDi and Q
ph
Di.
The operational constraints for open/closed switches are considered to equality
constraints. These are a set of equations given as
• Closed switch
V phi − V phj = 0
δphi − δphj = 0
(3.26)
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• Open switch
P phij = 0
Qphij = 0
(3.27)
3.3.3 Inequality constraints cineq (x)
These are the set of constraints on state variables that represent the system
operational and security limits, such as setting upper and lower limits for control
variables. The constraints are as follows:
• Bus voltage - Voltage magnitudes at each bus in the network:
V phmin,i ≤ V phi ≤ V phmax,i (3.28)
• Bus angle - The bus angle at each bus in the network:
−δphmin,i ≤ δphi ≤ δphmax,i (3.29)
The above equations are solved by the primal-dual interior point method. The
optimization problem has both equality and inequality constraints. Hence, the
method of primal-dual interior point with slack variables for the inequality con-
straints is used.
∆xk+1 = xk+1 − xk and H(xk) = [∂hfunc
∂x
]xk is the Jacobian matrix of dimension
3m × (n − 3). Where, n is the total number of buses in the system. The angles of
a particular bus (bus #1) are taken as references, such as 0◦ for phase a, −120◦ for
phase b and 120◦ for phase c. hfunc(x) is the measurement function of measurements
as a function of state variables. A measurement can be voltage magnitude, real and
reactive power flows, branch currents, real and reactive power injection. A typical
distribution system does not have many measurements. Most of the measurements
are branch current measurements. There are very few branch power measurements
, a very few injection measurements and voltage magnitude is only measured in the
substation bus. So most of the measurements are loads or pseudo measurements
and some are virtual or zero-injection measurements. The solution methodology as
49
3.4. MEASUREMENT MODEL Chapter 3
discussed in Section 3.2 requires the calculation of the Jacobian matrix H at each
iteration. The Jacobian matrix is the matrix of partial derivatives of measurement
functions with respect to the state variables of the system. The Jacobian matrix
can be expressed as:
H =


∂h1(x)
∂δ2
. . . ∂h1(x)
∂δn
∂h1(x)
∂V1
. . . ∂h1(x)
∂Vn
∂h2(x)
∂δ2
. . . ∂h2(x)
∂δn
∂h2(x)
∂V1
. . . ∂h2(x)
∂Vn
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
∂hm(x)
∂δ2
. . . ∂hm(x)
∂δn
∂hm(x)
∂V1
. . . ∂hm(x)
∂Vn


(3.30)
The measurement functions and the derivation of Jacobian elements related to New-
ton’s method are described in details in Section 3.4.
3.4 Measurement model
Considering the vector zmeas as a set of measurements and vector x as the state
vector, the non-linear measurement functions hfunc(x) are given below.
Measurement Function
i j
aa
ij
aa
ij jbg +
bb
ij
bb
ij jbg +
cc
ij
cc
ij jbg +
ab
ij
ab
ij jbg +
ac
ij
ac
ij jbg +
ba
ij
ba
ij jbg +
bc
ij
bc
ij jbg +
ca
ij
ca
ij jbg +
cb
ij
cb
ij jbg +
aa
si
aa
si jbg +
bb
si
bb
si jbg +
cc
si
cc
si jbg +
ab
si
ab
si jbg +
ac
si
ac
si jbg +
ba
si
ba
si jbg +
bc
si
bc
si jbg +
ca
si
ca
si jbg +
cb
si
cb
si jbg +
aa
sj
aa
sj jbg +
bb
sj
bb
sj jbg +
cc
sj
cc
sj jbg +
ab
sj
ab
sj jbg +
ac
sj
ac
sj jbg +
ba
sj
ba
sj jbg +
bc
sj
bc
sj jbg +
ca
sj
ca
sj jbg +
cb
sj
cb
sj jbg +
abc
ij
abc
ij QP ,
Figure 3.2: Two-port pi-model of a network
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The general two-port π-model for the network branches for a transmission sys-
tem is shown in Figure 3.2. The same model can be expanded to the three-phase
distribution system such that each element of the π-model for network branches is
a 3x3 matrix rather than a single element. This model has been used to relate the
state vector to each type of measurements [49].
Bus Power Injection
The real and reactive power injections at the ith bus for phase ph are given by:
P phi =
3∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
V phi V
l
j [G
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δlj) + Bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] (3.31)
Qphi = −
3∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
V phi V
l
j [B
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δlj)−Gph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] (3.32)
Considering the two-port π-model of the network branches, the line power flows
between bus i and bus j for a phase ph are given by:
P phij =
3∑
l=1
[V phi V
l
i (g
ph,l
ij +g
ph,l
si )−V phi V lj (gph,lij cos(δphi −δlj))+bph,lij sin(δphi −δlj)] (3.33)
Qphij = −
3∑
l=1
[V phi V
l
i (b
ph,l
ij +b
ph,l
si )+V
ph
i V
l
j (g
ph,l
ij sin(δ
ph
i −δlj)+bph,lij cos(δphi −δlj))] (3.34)
The line current between bus i and bus j for a phase ph is given by:
Iphij =
√
(P phij )
2 + (Qphij )
2
V phi
(3.35)
As the above equations are non-linear, so the vector measurement functions are
linearised around an operating point. Hence, it is required to compute the Jacobian
matrix whose elements are the first order derivatives of the measurement functions
with respect to the state variables. The Jacobian elements corresponding to the real
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and reactive power injections are:
∂P phi
∂δli
l=ph
=
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
V phi V
ph
j [−Gph,phij sin(δphi − δphj ) + Bph,phij cos(δphi − δphj )]
+
3∑
l=1
l 6=ph
n∑
j=1
V phi V
l
j [−Gph,lij sin(δphi − δli) +Bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)]
= −Qphi − (V phi )2Bph,phii
(3.36)
∂P phi
∂δli
l 6=ph
= V phi V
l
i [G
ph,l
ii sin(δ
ph
i − δli)−Bph,lii cos(δphi )] (3.37)
∂P phi
∂δlj
= V phi V
l
j [G
ph,l
ij sin(δ
ph
i − δphj )−Bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)] (3.38)
∂P phi
∂V li
l=ph
= 2V phi G
ph,ph
ii +
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
V phj [G
ph,ph
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δphj ) + Bph,phij sin(δphi − δphj )]
+
3∑
l=1
l 6=ph
n∑
j=1
V lj [G
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δlj) + Bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] + Pn(cp2(
1
Vn
) + cp3(
V
V 2n
))
=
P phi
V phi
+ V phi G
ph,l
ii + Pn(c
p
2(
1
Vn
) + cp3(
V
V 2n
))
(3.39)
∂P phi
∂V lj
= V phi [G
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δlj) + Bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] (3.40)
∂Qphi
∂δli
l=ph
= −
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
V phi V
ph
j [−Bph,lij sin(δphi − δphj )−Gph,lij cos(δphi − δphj )]
−
3∑
l=1
l 6=ph
n∑
j=1
V phi V
l
j [−Bph,lij sin(δphi − δli)−Gph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)]
= P phi − (V phi )2Gph,phii
(3.41)
∂Qphi
∂δli
l=ph
= −V phi V li [Bph,lii sin(δphi − δli) +Gph,lii cos(δphi − δli)] (3.42)
∂Qphi
∂δlj
= −V phi V lj [Bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj) +Gph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)] (3.43)
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∂Qphi
∂V li
l=ph
= −2V phi Bph,phii −
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
V phj [B
ph,ph
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δphj )−Gph,phij sin(δphi − δphj )]
−
3∑
l=1
l 6=ph
n∑
j=1
V lj [B
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δphj )−Gph,lij sin(δphi − δphj )] +Qn(cQ2 (
1
Vn
) + cQ3 (
V
V 2n
))
= −Q
ph
i
V phi
− V phi Bph,lii +Qn(cQ2 (
1
Vn
) + cQ3 (
V
V 2n
))
(3.44)
∂Qphi
∂V lj
= −V phi [Bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)−Gph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] (3.45)
The Jacobian elements corresponding to the real and reactive power flows between
bus i and bus j are:
∂P phij
∂δli
l=ph
= −
3∑
l=1
V ki V
l
j [−gph,lij sin(δphi − δlj) + bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)]
= −Qphij − (V phi )2[bph,lij + bph,lsi ]
(3.46)
∂P phij
∂δli
l 6=ph
= V phi V
l
i [g
ph,l
ij sin(δ
ph
i − δli)− bph,lij cos(δphi − δli)] (3.47)
∂P phij
∂δlj
= −V phi V lj [gph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)− bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)] (3.48)
∂P phij
∂V li
l=ph
= V phi [g
ph,ph
ij + g
ph,l
si ]
+
3∑
l=1
[V li g
ph,ph
ij + g
ph,l
si − V lj [gph,lij cos(δphi − δlj) + bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)]]
=
P phij
V phi
+ V phi [g
ph,ph
ij + g
ph,l
si ]
(3.49)
∂P phij
∂V li
l 6=ph
= V phi [g
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δli) + bph,lij sin(δphi − δli) + gph,lsi ] (3.50)
∂P phij
∂V lj
= −V phi [gph,lij cos(δphi − δlj) + bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] (3.51)
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∂Qphij
∂δli
l=ph
= −
3∑
l=1
V phi V
l
j [g
ph,l
ij cos(δ
ph
i − δlj) + bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)]
= P phij − (V phi )2[gph,phij + gph,lsi ]
(3.52)
∂Qphij
∂δli
l 6=ph
= V phi V
l
i [−gph,lij cos(δphi − δli)− bphij sin(δphi − δli)] (3.53)
∂Qphij
∂δlj
= −V phi V lj [−gph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)− bph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)] (3.54)
∂Qphij
∂V li
l=ph
= −V phi [bph,lij + bph,lsi ]
+
3∑
l=1
[−V li (bph,lij + bph,lsi )− V lj [gph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)− bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)]]
=
Qphij
V phi
− V phi [bph,lij + bph,lsi ]
(3.55)
∂Qphij
∂V li
l 6=ph
= V phi [g
ph,l
ij sin(δ
ph
i − δli)− bph,lij cos(δphi − δli) + bph,lsi ] (3.56)
∂Qphij
∂V lj
= −V phi [gph,lij sin(δphi − δlj)− bph,lij cos(δphi − δlj)] (3.57)
The Jacobian elements corresponding to the branch current flows between bus i and
bus j are:
∂Iphij
∂δli
=
real(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[V li g
ph,l
ij sin δ
l
i + b
ph,l
ij cos δ
l
i]
+
imag(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[V li −gph,lij cos δli + bph,lij sin δli] (3.58)
∂Iphij
∂δlj
=
real(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[V lj−gph,lij sin δlj − bph,lij cos δlj]
+
imag(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[−V lj−gph,lij cos δlj + bph,lij sin δlj] (3.59)
∂Iphij
∂V li
=
real(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[−gph,lij cos δli + bph,lij sin δli]
+
imag(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[−gph,lij sin δli − bph,lij cos δli] (3.60)
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∂Iphij
∂V lj
=
real(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[gph,lij cos δ
l
j − bph,lij sin δlj]
+
imag(Iphij )
|Iphij |
[gph,lij sin δ
l
j + b
ph,l
ij cos δ
l
j] (3.61)
The Jacobian elements corresponding to the voltage magnitude measurements at
bus i are:
∂V phi
∂δli
= 0 (3.62)
∂V phi
∂δlj
= 0 (3.63)
∂V phi
∂V li
l=ph
= 1 (3.64)
∂V phi
∂V li
l 6=ph
= 0 (3.65)
∂V phi
∂V lj
i6=j
= 0 (3.66)
where, n is the number of buses and l is the phase index Gph,lij + B
ph,l
ij is the ij
th
element of the bus admittance matrix between phase ph and phase l and gph,lij + b
ph,l
ij
is the admittance of the series branch connecting bus i and bus j between phase ph
and phase l.
The Jacobian H is used in every iteration to find the Gain matrix and calculate
the correction vector.
3.5 Case studies and discussions
3.5.1 Simulation results
IEEE 13-bus system
A standard IEEE-13 bus distribution system has been used here. The feeders
are small yet they show some interesting characteristics as discussed in Section 2.7
of Chapter 2. The system represents a typical distribution system with voltage
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magnitude measurements only at the substation, with more branch current mea-
surements than power flow measurements, and all loads are considered as pseudo
measurements. Phase c for bus 3 and phase a and c for bus 10 are zero injection or
virtual measurements.
Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2 shows the typical IEEE 13-bus system. A WLS state
estimator is coded in Matlab and tested on the standard IEEE-13 bus system and
run on a system with Intel Xeon processor @3.33GHz and 12 GB RAM. No Matlab
toolbox was used. The complete system data are given in [51], [52] and Appendix
A.
The overhead lines and underground cables are modelled by modified Carson’s
equations. The loads are modelled in ZIP model and the three-phase transformer is
configured as a grounded Y-Y connection. Measurements have been generated using
normal distribution curve with load flow values as true or mean values and stan-
dard deviation. Each measurement is taken from the distribution curve randomly
and this experiment is performed a number of times in a Monte Carlo approach.
One such case has been shown here, in the results. It is assumed that the mea-
surements are taken from independent meters placed at different locations (nodes
and branches). Hence, the measurement errors are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed. The zero injections are considered as equality constraints.
The voltage magnitudes are set to operate within 5% of the nominal values and the
voltage angles within −30◦ to +30◦. The switch between buses 9 and 10 is assumed
to be closed. Therefore, equality constraints in the state estimation formulation are
used as shown in equation (2.9). The loads on nodes 2, 9 and 10 are delta-configured
loads. The constant impedance loads are on nodes 2 and 10, while nodes 10 and 7
have constant current loads.
Table 3.1 present the load flow values of the state variables and Table 3.2 shows
their estimates. The error in real measurement is assumed to be 3% and the error
in pseudo measurement is assumed to be 20%. The load flow values are considered
to be the true values. Figure 3.3 show the true and estimated voltage magnitudes
of the three phases for the IEEE-13 bus model. For the ease of Matlab coding it is
assumed that at each iteration the missing phases are of voltage magnitude value
56
3.5. CASESTUDIESANDDISCUSSIONS Chapter3
Table3.1:LoadFlowResults
Angle(indegrees) Voltagemagnitude(inpu)
BusNo. pha phb phc pha phb phc
1 0 -120 120 1 1 1
2 - -119.565 119.357 - 0.9888 1.0063
3 - -119.6173 119.4225 - 0.9893 1.0062
4 -0.2412 -119.6838 119.5482 0.9943 0.9923 1.0054
5 -0.264 -119.7004 119.5467 0.9940 0.9916 1.0045
6 -0.4976 -119.8652 119.3859 0.9960 0.9930 1.0082
7 - - 119.3912 - - 1.0069
8 -0.6488 - 119.414 0.9886 - 1.008
9 -0.631 -119.2481 119.4222 0.9893 0.9936 1.0092
10 -0.631 -119.2481 119.4222 0.9893 0.9936 1.0092
11 -0.6725 -119.258 119.4517 0.9881 0.9939 1.0083
12 -0.6242 - - 0.9868 - -
13 -0.6317 -119.2475 119.4221 0.9890 0.9936 1.0091
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Table 3.2: State Estimates
Angle estimates(in degrees) Voltage estimates(in pu)
Bus No. ph a ph b ph c ph a ph b ph c
1 0 -120 120 1.0006 0.9980 1.0030
2 - -119.566 119.5905 - 0.9897 1.0068
3 - -119.6192 119.6037 - 0.9899 1.0070
4 -0.2794 -119.6875 119.6423 0.9944 0.9925 1.0076
5 -0.3005 -119.7033 119.6340 0.9920 0.9919 1.0057
6 -0.5364 -119.8673 119.4340 0.9940 0.9923 1.0064
7 - - 119.4432 - - 1.0053
8 -0.6496 - 119.4655 0.9867 - 1.0065
9 -0.6319 -119.2681 119.4736 0.9893 0.9930 1.0076
10 -0.6319 -119.2681 119.4736 0.9892 0.9930 1.0076
11 -0.6519 -119.2604 119.4922 0.9891 0.9936 1.0095
12 -0.6253 - - 0.9875 - -
13 -0.6323 -119.2676 119.4736 0.9900 0.9950 1.0116
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equal to 1. However, the state estimation process is performed with 40% and 50%
error in pseudo measurements as well. Figure 3.4 shows that for cases when the
error in pseudo measurement is large the state estimates are less accurate. The
figure shows that when the error is 20% the estimates for phase a are closest to the
true value compared to other cases. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the missing phases have
been represented by dashes. There is a closed switch between bus 9 and 10. Figure
3.3 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that the voltage magnitude values and voltage
angles remain the same across the closed switch. The obtained results have been
found to be satisfactory within the allowable tolerance (±3σ) from equation (3.12).
IEEE 123-bus system
The IEEE 123-bus system has also been considered as a case study. The system
test feeder has a nominal voltage of 4.16 kV and the system has some remarkable
features as mentioned in Section 2.7 of Chapter 2.
The lines are modelled according to Carson’s equations as in [49] and the loads
are modelled in ZIP-model. There is one on-load tap changer (OLTC) (the sec-
ondary of OLTC is on node 1), three step voltage regulators (between nodes 10 and
15, 118 and 68, 26 and 27) and shunt capacitor banks (on nodes 84, 89, 91 and
93). The switches in the system provide optimal configuration options. A three-
phase transformer is modelled as three individual single-phase transformers. The
tap changers are considered to have fixed taps. The details of the system are given
in [51, 54]. The topology of the system is shown in Figure 2.3 of the last chapter.
The cases for two cases have been shown here. The one with switch between 19-116
closed and between 52-121 open. In the second case, the switch between 52-121
closed and between 19-116 open. The switches between buses 14 and 117, 61 and
118, 98 and 119 are considered closed in both the cases.
As for the previous case study, measurements have been generated using nor-
mal distribution curve with load flow values as true or mean values and standard
deviation. Each measurement is taken from the distribution curve randomly and
this experiment is performed a number of times in a Monte Carlo approach. One
such case has been shown here, in the results. It is assumed that the measurement
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Figure 3.7: True and estimated voltages for IEEE 123 bus system
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Figure 3.9: True and estimated voltage angles for IEEE 123 bus system
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Figure 3.10: True and estimated voltage angles for IEEE 123 bus system
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Figure 3.11: True and estimated voltages for IEEE 123 bus system with changed
switch status
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
Bus number
V
ol
ta
ge
 (p
u)
 
 
True V
b
Estimated V
b
Figure 3.12: True and estimated voltages for IEEE 123 bus system with changed
switch status
63
3.5. CASE STUDIES AND DISCUSSIONS Chapter 3
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
Bus number
V
ol
ta
ge
 (p
u)
 
 
True V
c
Estimated V
c
Figure 3.13: True and estimated voltages for IEEE 123 bus system with changed
switch status
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Figure 3.15: True and estimated voltage angles for IEEE 123 bus system with
changed switch status
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errors are independent and identically distributed. The zero injections are consid-
ered as equality constraints. The voltage magnitudes are set to operate within 5%
of the nominal values and the voltage angles within −30◦ to +30◦. The error in real
measurement is assumed to be 3% and the error in pseudo measurement is assumed
to be 40%. Figure 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 show the true and estimated voltage magnitudes of
the three phases for the IEEE-123 bus model for case I. Whereas, Figure 3.11, 3.12,
3.13 show the true and estimated voltage magnitudes of the three phases when the
switch status are changed. Figure 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and Figure 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 further
show the true and estimated voltage angles of the three phases for case I and the
case when the switch status is changed respectively. The obtained results have been
found to be satisfactory within the allowable tolerance (±3σ) from equation (3.12).
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents a WLS three-phase state estimation based on detailed
modelling of the different components of three phase system considering both the
star and delta-configured loads. The method achieved a reliable solution to the
state estimation problem. Simulation results on IEEE 13-bus and IEEE 123-bus
distribution system showed the effectiveness of the approach and the SE results have
been compared with the load flow results. The cases with different switch status
have also been implemented on the 123-bus system. The reliable state estimation
results provides the basis for control and monitoring of modern distribution systems.
However, the state estimates are affected by the accuracy of the measurements-
real and pseudo. Thus, a large measurement error can result in wrong distribu-
tion operation and control decisions. The accuracy of the measurement meters are
compromised due to various reasons. This is discussed in the next chapter. The
measurements can also be compromised by an attacker for his own benefits. The
attacker disguises the attack in such a way that the traditional bad data detec-
tion techniques are unable to identify them. This poses a serious challenge to the
EMS/DMS. The next chapters discuss the vulnerabilities and a detection technique
based on diagnostic robust generalized potential and studentized residuals.
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Vulnerabilities associated with State
Estimation
One of the essential benefits of using a state estimator is to detect, identify
and correct measurement errors. This is known as bad data detection. Depending
on the state estimation procedure, bad data processing can be carried out as part
of the estimation process or as a post-estimation process. However, irrespective of
the process, detection of bad data can only be done if there are enough redundant
measurements in the system. Redundant measurements can be removed from the
measurement matrix without making the system unobservable. With a given set of
measurements the system is said to be observable if a unique estimate of the states
can be found. The network observability is ensured by graph theory method prior to
the estimation process. So, when there is an error in a redundant measurement, this
can be detected by statistical tests based on measurement residuals [55]. However,
removal of a critical measurement will lead the system to an unobservable system.
Measurements may contain errors due to various reasons. Random errors usually
exist in measurements due to the finite accuracy of the meters and the telecommuni-
cation medium. Large measurement errors can also occur when the meters have bi-
ases, drifts or wrong connections. Telecommunication system failures or noise caused
by unexpected interference also lead to large deviations in recorded measurements.
Apart from these the state estimator may be affected by incorrect topology infor-
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mation which can be subsequently interpreted as bad data. With the integration
of PMUs, smart metering and communication infrastructure into the system, the
modern power system is gradually becoming more and more cyber-physical rather
than only physical system. As more and more advanced communication and cy-
ber technologies are getting incorporated, the possibility of an adversary to tamper
with the meter data to cause the state estimator to produce wrong estimates is also
increasing [24,25].
Over the years, state estimation has been developed to deal with gross error in
data because of inaccuracy of the measurements. Any tampering with data and/or
maliciously operating switch will also result in gross errors in data. If an adversary
gains control of the switches/circuit breakers he/she can change the topology of the
system completely. This would result in faulty measurement data. So in principle,
the effect of malicious attack can be detected through bad data detection. Depend-
ing on the state estimation methodology bad data detection can be part of state
estimation process or a post estimation computation as shown in Figure 4.1. As
long as these errors are part of over measured systems (more measurements than
the number of states to be estimated) and do not belong to the critical measurement
and leverage points (measurements that significantly influence the state estimation
solution), eliminating them to get a clear and accurate estimate is not difficult.
However, if these bad data belong to the meters in the leverage set they need to be
handled carefully. The leverage measurements help in improving the state variable
estimates of the system by providing sufficient redundancy. The critical measure-
ments are those whose removal affects the system observability. References [56]
and [57] have discussed about protection of some or all of basic measurements or
critical k-tuples in the system. A critical k-tuple is a set of measurements for which,
if all the measurements of the set are lost, then the network becomes unobservable.
However, the leverage measurements are not protected. The leverages can occur
both in transmission and distribution networks [58]. The leverage measurements
are explained in Section 4.1. This requires to develop a methodology to deal with
the situation.
A schematic similar to Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 of a typical energy/distribution
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Figure 4.1: A typical energy/distribution management system architecture
management system with ICT infrastructure is shown in Figure 4.1.
Traditionally, the detection of bad data has been carried out by largest normal-
ized residuals (LNR), which performs pretty well when there is a single bad measure-
ment or multiple non-interacting bad measurements in the system [59]. However, it
fails in case of influential or leverage measurements [20].
References [26] and [27] have proposed a χ2 test for the identification of bad
measurements. In the χ2 test if the WLS state estimation objective function value
is more than a predefined threshold then the presence of bad data is suspected.
Otherwise, there is no bad data in the measurement set.
Chen and Abur have proposed the method of placement of PMUs to enable
bad data detection in state estimation [35]. The placement of PMUs at strategic
locations will eliminate measurement criticality and thus help in bad data detection.
References [36] and [60] have devised the concepts of robust distances and influ-
ence functions in regression analysis of measurement equations to identify leverage
points in a system.
But none of these references discussed the issue of detecting bad data in leverage
data points. Therefore, security associated with the state estimator has become a
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matter of particular concern and hence, robust methods have to be resorted to in
detection, identification and elimination of bad data from state estimation.
4.1 Leverage Points and Bad Data
Leverage points
The state estimation problem as discussed in Chapter 3 is linearized around an
operating point and is expressed as the following regression model.
∆z = H∆x+ e (4.1)
where z is considered the output of the regression model and x is the regressor vector,
predictor or the factor in the regression model and e is the random error vector,
which are random and assumed to be independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), in the regression model. The matrixH is known as the coefficient or regressor
matrix. The detection, assessment and understanding of influential points are the
main areas of study in the regression model building. The factor variables or the
explanatory variables in the regression model are solved by least squares estimation
as in equations (3.17) and (3.18). From equation (3.11), the estimated measurement
vector is derived as
∆zˆ = H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1∆z (4.2)
Or,
R−1/2∆zˆ = R−1/2H((R−1/2H)TR−1/2H)−1(R−1/2H)TR−1/2∆z (4.3)
∆ˆ˜z = H˜(H˜T H˜)−1H˜T∆z˜ (4.4)
Where,
∆ˆ˜z = R−1/2∆zˆ, H˜ = R−1/2H, ∆z˜ = R−1/2∆z
Therefore,
K = H˜(H˜T H˜)−1H˜T (4.5)
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where, K is called the hat or high-leverage matrix.
The matrixK shows some remarkable properties. It is symmetric (K = KT ) and
idempotent (K.K. . . . .K = K). Hence, the diagonal element Kii can be expressed
as
Kii = K
2
ii +
∑
i6=j
K2ij (4.6)
where, Kij is the non-diagonal element. Therefore, the value of the diagonal element
lies between 0 and 1.
A large diagonal entry of the hat matrix implies that the particular measurement
has more leverage or influence on the estimated states than others and they are
referred to as leverage points. If the influence is high enough the corresponding
diagonal entry may be close to 1. In other words, according to equation (4.1), each
observation (∆zi,Hi) is a point in the factor space of regression, where Hi is a row of
the H matrix. When there is an outlier in the X-space or Hi-space or the regressor
variable space, it is said to have an undue influence on the state estimates and is
called a leverage measurement.
Bad data
The concept of bad data and outliers go hand in hand in the context of regres-
sion jargon. Bad data usually refers to an erroneous measurement due to various
reasons. Due to the integration of PMUs, intelligent and smart metering with ICT
infrastructure, the modern power network is a cyber-physical system rather than a
physical system. It uses the telecommunication medium for data transfer. Bad data
or gross errors can occur during the data transfer over the SCADA telemetry sys-
tem. Telecommunication system failures or noise caused by unexpected interference
also lead to large deviations in recorded measurements. So, these bad data or gross
errors can be looked as outliers in the measurement space. However, a measurement,
which may or may not contain errors, such as leverage points, may also appear as
outliers due to the structure of the corresponding regression equation. As a result, it
is essential to differentiate the leverage points from bad data and identify the error,
if any, in leverage points. In the modern power system, more and more advanced
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communication and cyber technologies are getting incorporated [20]. Therefore, the
possibility of an adversary to tamper with the measurements to drive the state esti-
mator to wrong estimates is also high. Theoretically, the bad data detection (BDD)
technique using normalized residual is a post-estimation process. Essentially, the
largest normalized residual (LNR) method is used to detect, identify and eliminate
bad measurement data. The largest normalized residual refers to the test where the
largest normalized residual corresponds to the bad measurement data. Normalized
residual based approaches for identification of bad data have been reported in [27]
and [26]. In the case of one erroneous measurement data, the largest normalized
residual works perfectly fine. It has been reported in the literature [26, 27] that
LNR also works on both non-interacting and interacting non-conforming multiple
bad measurement data. However, it fails to detect the bad data if there are multiple
interacting and conforming bad data [59],where the errors are in agreement, and if
they are part of the leverage set. Moreover, the residuals are given as
r = ∆z −∆zˆ (4.7)
Eq.(4.7) can be rewritten as
r = (I−K)∆z (4.8)
Therefore, the measurement residuals with large diagonal entries of the hat matrix
are small even if it is contaminated with gross error.
4.2 Attack Strategies
In power systems, the state estimator as mentioned in Figure 4.1 takes three
kinds of inputs-the meter measurement data (power injection and power flow), the
network topology information data (on/off status of switches) and the parameter
data (branch impedance and variances of measurement errors). Typically, these
inputs are either sent from meters to control center or stored in the databases. It is
assumed that the adversary can access and manipulate all the three kinds of inputs.
The leverage measurements occur when there are injection measurements on
a bus, which has a larger number of branches connected to it compared to others,
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injection measurements on a bus incident to branches with very different impedances,
and the line power flow measurements on relatively short lines. In large meshed
distribution systems these leverages can occur due to the presence of line power
flow measurements on short lines [58] and also due to the lower redundancy of
measurements. An adversary can take advantage of this situation and attack the
high leverage points to influence the estimates of the state variables of the system
and hence, can hide the attack from being detected. The leverage points affected by
gross errors are called bad leverage points. Though bad leverage points are harmful
to many estimators, good leverage points are particularly useful in improving the
variance of the estimates.
4.2.1 Attacking power flow measurements
Power flow measurements are normally placed between buses to monitor the
flow of the branches. Leverage power flow measurements are formed when the
measurements are placed on relatively short or long lines. An attacker, if he/she
intends to make the attack invisible, makes changes to the value of impedance of
the branch by applying Theorem 2 and rule 1 and rule 2 as given in [61].
4.2.2 Attacking power injection measurements
Power injection measurements are placed at a bus to monitor the active and
reactive power injections from a load or generations at a particular bus. A node/bus
is particularly vulnerable to leverage attack if that has more connecting branches
connected to it or in other words there are more non-zero elements in that row of
the H as in (3.30) matrix compared to other rows. If an adversary wishes to attack
an injection leverage measurements he/she should increase the particular diagonal
element of the hat matrix to make the attack undetectable by applying Theorem 2
and rule 1 and rule 2 as given in [61].
To make a successful attack, the attacker makes changes to the impedance of
a branch by applying Theorem 2 and rule 1 and rule 2. The theorems 1,2 and 3
are stated in Appendix D. Theorem 1 states how a successful attack can be made
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on a measurement by changing Kii. While Theorem 2 shows how much Kii has to
be increased to make an attack on a single measurement zi. To make an attack on
multiple measurements, the attacker will perturb the measurements one at a time
and apply Theorem 2 repeatedly. Finally, Theorem 3 suggests how to increase the
value of Kii.
4.3 Masking and Swamping
The leverage points in regression studies carry with them an inherent difficulty.
When there are more than one influential point, some of them may remain unde-
tected. This phenomenon is known as masking. On the other hand, some of the
non-influential points may be wrongly detected as influential points, which is known
as swamping. The masking/swamping can be explained by the following equation.
The residual for the ith measurement with two high leverages at zi and zk is
expressed as
ri = (1−Kii)∆zi −Kik∆zk −
m∑
j=1
j 6=i,j 6=k
Kij∆zj (4.9)
So, if the first two terms in equation (4.9) are opposite in sign a bad leverage may
appear like a good leverage. This is known as masking. On the other hand, if the
second and the third terms in the same equation add up to a large value the good
leverage may become a bad leverage. This is known as swamping.
The masking and swamping phenomena have been reported in the literature as
in Hawkins, Bradu and Kass (HBK) data, Brownlee’s stack loss data [62, 63], Hadi
and Simonoff (HS) data, Belgian Telephone data etc. In the HBK data there are 75
observations, 14 high leverage points and 10 outliers with points 11-14 are swamped
cases. The Brownlee’s data shows, however, that there are 21 observations with 4
outliers (cases 1,3,4,21) and 4 high leverage points (cases 1,2,3,21). There are two
points which are masked and on the other hand point 17 is swamped. The mask-
ing/swamping phenomenon can influence the final outcome of the detection proce-
dure and result in faulty detection of bad data or leverage point. This swamping
or masking phenomenon is, however, not present when there is only one influential
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measurement. This case is similar to the largest normalized residual (LNR) test to
identify outliers. Hence, when there are multiple outliers or bad data or influential
points the largest normalized residual test is deemed unsuitable. To the best of my
knowledge, the masking/swamping phenomenon has not been investigated in the
context of power system state estimation. This sets up the motivation to devise a
method by which the high leverage points, low leverage points and outliers or bad
data are completely separated and identified.
The next sections provide a review of the different diagnostic techniques related
to identification of gross error and discusses the suitability of externally studentized
residuals for this purpose.
4.4 Diagnostics based on Residual Analysis
Multiple linear regression model building is one of the standard problems in
chemometrics [64]. The linearised measurement equations for state estimation can
be interpreted as regression modelling. Each measurement can be considered as a
point in the (n + 1)-dimensional regression plane. The term regression diagnostics
has been used for a collection of methods for the identification of influential points,
and for the identification of violations of the assumptions of least-squares. The
residuals are defined as
r = ∆z −∆zˆ (4.10)
The residuals give a measure of the presence of bad data in the system. Thus,
analysis of residuals provide a diagnostic for bad data detection. There are different
kinds of residuals based on mathematical definition. These are highlighted in the
following subsections.
4.4.1 Normalized residuals
Researchers have also addressed the issue by χ2-test as in [27], by Hypothesis
Testing Identification (HTI) as mentioned in [27] and some researchers have also
used normalized residual for the detection of bad data [27].
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In lines with the WLS state estimation, the errors are assumed to be normally
distributed as ei ∽ N(0, Rii) and hence, the residuals are also normally distributed
as r ∽ N(0,Ω) where, Ω = SR, where S = I − K. Therefore, the normalized
residuals of the measurements can be determined as
rNi =
|ri|√
Ωii
=
|ri|√
RiiSii
(4.11)
The normalized residuals will then have Standard Normal Distribution rNi ∽ N(0, 1).
4.4.2 χ2-test for bad data detection
The measurement residual is a normally distributed variable and the residuals
are independent. Therefore
J =
3m∑
i=1
R−1ii (zi − hi(x))2 (4.12)
=
3m∑
i=1
R−1ii r
2
i (4.13)
According to statistical properties, the objective function, being the weighted sum
of the residuals will follow a χ2 distribution with (3m − n) degrees of freedom. If
the estimated value of this objective function J(xˆ) is more than a threshold for a
certain detection confidence probability of 97.5% then the measurements are said to
have bad data. Otherwise, the measurements are error free. This is known as the
χ2-test for identification of bad data.
4.4.3 Largest Normalized Residual
The largest normalized residual (LNR) will correspond to the erroneous data
if there is only one bad data in the measurement system. Hence, if the largest
normalized residual is more than a threshold (say 3) then the system is said to have
erroneous measurement. Otherwise the measurements are considered to be free from
error.
The LNR test is able to detect the bad data if there is only one bad data in
the system [26, 27]. It even works on both non-interacting and interacting non-
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conforming multiple bad measurement data. However, it fails when there are mul-
tiple interacting conforming bad data, where the errors are in agreement [59].
4.4.4 DFFITS
In statistical regression, some of the data points exert more influence on the
regression characteristics than the other points. Data point with large residuals and
high leverages can distort the accuracy and shape of the regression. Researchers
have addressed this problem by applying many diagnostic measures. DFFITS is a
diagnostic measure to identify influential points. It is defined as the change in the
estimated value of the measurement obtained when the influential data point is left
out. It is further standardized by dividing by the estimated standard deviation of
the fit at that point. It is defined by
DFFITSi =
zˆi − zˆ−ii
σˆ−i
√
Kii
(4.14)
DFFITSi =
hTi (xˆ− xˆ−i)
σˆ−i
√
Kii
(4.15)
where,
Kii is the leverage value of the point
σˆ−i is the estimated standard deviation without the influential point
xˆ−i are the fitted state variables without the point in question
zˆ−i are the estimated measurement values without the point in question
By definition, DFFITS is the influence of an observation on its own fitted value. It
has also been referred to as Welsch and Kuh’s distance in some literatures [65, 66].
4.4.5 DFBETA
DFBETA is the diagnostic measure which is defined by the change in the esti-
mated value of the state variable or regression coefficient obtained when the influ-
ential data point in question is left out.
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The mathematical expression for DFBETA has the general form
DFBETAi = xˆi − xˆ−ii =
(HTH)−1hTi eˆi
1−Kii (4.16)
It is measure of the influence of an observation on a particular regression coefficient.
4.4.6 Cook’s distance
Cook’s distance is a commonly used measure for the influence of a data point
named after the American statistician R. Dennis Cook [67]. Cook’s distance is
defined as the influence of an observation on all fitted values. It can be expressed as
CDi =
(xˆ−i − xˆ)T (HTH)(xˆ−i − xˆ)
pσˆ2
(4.17)
CDi =
σˆ−i
pσˆ2
DFFITSi (4.18)
where,
p is the number of fitted parameters.
xˆ are the fitted state variables.
xˆ−i are the fitted state variables without the point in question.
H is the Jacobian matrix as mentioned in the last chapter.
4.4.7 Studentized residuals
The diagnostics for single case influential observations are ineffective in case of
multiple influential observations due to masking/swamping effects. Masking is said
to occur if a bad data point, in the presence of other bad data points, appears as a
good data point. Similarly swamping is said to occur if a good data point, in the
presence of other bad data points, behaves as a bad data point. The phenomenon of
masking and/or swamping has been explained in Section 4.3. Let the set of deleted
cases be D and the set of remaining cases be R. When a group of observations is
deleted
K
−(D)
ii = h
T
i (H
T
RHR)
−1hi
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K
−(D)
ii is the i
th diagonal element of the H(HTRHR)
−1HT matrix. Most of the outlier
detection methods separate the clean observations from the potential outliers.
When an additional point i is added to the set R, according to [66,68]
K
−(D)+i
ii = h
T
i (H
T
RHR + hih
T
i )
−1hi =
K
−(D)
ii
1 +K
−(D)
ii
The new state variables with the additional point i in the set R is given by
∆xˆR+i = (H
T
RHR + hih
T
i )
−1(HTR∆zR + hi∆zi)
= ∆xˆR +
(HTRHR)
−1hi
1 +K
−(D)
ii
r∗st,i
Let r
−(D)
i be the i
th deletion residual.
r∗,R+ist,i =
r
−(D)
i
σˆR
√
1 +K
−(D)
ii
The variances of the observations in the basic subset and outside the basic subset
are given [69] as:
1− hTi (HTRHR)−1hi, i ∈ R
1 + hTi (H
T
RHR)
−1hi, i /∈ R
The studentized residuals for the two subsets are given as
r
−(D)
i
σˆR
√
1− hTi (HTRHR)−1hi
, i ∈ R
r
−(D)
i
σˆR
√
1 + hTi (H
T
RHR)
−1hi
, i /∈ R
Internally and externally studentized residuals
The externally studentized residual has a clear advantage over standardized
residuals. The standardized residual includes the ith observation, which could be
an outlier, which influences the least square function. But an externally studen-
tized residual removes the ith observation while calculating the variance estimate.
Mathematically the internally studentized residual is given as
rst,i =
ri
σˆ
√
1−Kii
(4.19)
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For a standardized residual, it is standardized by dividing by σˆ, the ordinary stan-
dard deviation estimate. But in case of externally studentized residual, it is divided
by a factor σˆ(i), which is the standard deviation estimate in an estimation model
with the ith data deleted. In other words, while the numerator and denominator
are not independent in case of standardized residuals, they are independent in case
of externally studentized residuals in the expression for residuals. Thus, in general,
externally studentized residuals will be more effective in detecting outliers.
4.5 Robust estimators
The WLS state estimator assumes that the measurement errors are independent
and identically normally distributed. However, due to the presence of bad data
the performance of WLS estimator reduces considerably. The robust estimation
techniques are used to address these issues. The concept of robust estimation was
first introduced by Huber [70]. Mili et al. [71] were the first to apply in power
system. The class of robust estimators for power system are called M-estimators.
The objective for a generalised M-estimator is given by
min J =
m∑
i=1
φ(ri) (4.20)
where, m is the number of measurements. Depending on the function φ, different
types of estimators have been explored.
4.5.1 Quadratic Constant estimator
The quadratic constant (QC) estimator behaves like WLS inside the threshold
and takes a constant value outside the threshold.
φ(ri) =

 r
2
i if |ri| ≤ ctune
c2tune otherwise
(4.21)
Although the QC estimator has better bad data rejection properties, the objective
function is non-convex, which gives rise to convergence and computational difficul-
ties.
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4.5.2 Square Root estimator
The objective function of a square root (SR) estimator is given by
φ(ri) =

 r
2
i if |ri| ≤ ctune
4c
3/2
tune
√
ri − 3c2tune otherwise
(4.22)
The SR estimator with no bad data reduces to WLS. But, the φ function is propor-
tional to the square root of the residual if there is a bad data. Its bad data rejection
property is between SHGM and QC estimators. Therefore, it is computationally
similar to WLS technique.
4.5.3 Schweppe-Huber Generalized M-estimator
The Schweppe-Huber Generalized M (SHGM) estimator combines both WLAV
and WLS estimators. The φ function is given by
φ(ri) =


1
2
r2i if |ri| ≤ ctunewfactor,i
ctunewfactor,i |ri| − 12c2tunew2factor,i otherwise
(4.23)
It behaves like the WLS estimator for small values of residuals. However, it behaves
like the WLAV estimator outside the threshold. The performance of this estimator
depends on the tuning parameter ctune and weighting factor wfactor,i. The value of
the tuning factor ctune usually is between 1 and 4.
4.5.4 Least Absolute Value estimator
The weighted least absolute value (WLAV) estimator is based on minimizing
the sum of the absolute values of the weighted residuals. It is less sensitive to the
presence of bad data. The WLAV estimator can simultaneously detect and reject
bad data. It is expressed as
φ(ri) = |ri| (4.24)
However, the complexity and computational time makes it impractical to use for
real time state estimation applications [72].
81
4.6. CONCLUSIONS Chapter 4
Robust estimators are extremely handy in terms of bad data rejection. However,
it carries with it some inherent downsides. These robust estimators may sometimes
get stuck in the local minima. Over and above that, these estimators may suffer
from slow convergence or sometimes divergence. In case of poor redundancy, which
is quite possible in distribution systems, there is a possibility of numerically unob-
servable solution. As a result, there is a high risk of wrong identification of bad
data.
This gives a motivation to apply WLS estimator in this research. WLS works
well on the assumption that the errors are normally distributed. Moreover, the WLS
is computationally fast and results in the global minimum solution.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter presents the vulnerabilities of the modern power system. It empha-
sises particularly on the specific vulnerability in relation to the leverage measurement
data points. The attack strategies associated with power injection and power flow
measurements and the masking/swamping phenomenon have been investigated. The
different types of residual diagnostic techniques and robust estimation methods have
been explored. The externally studentized residuals have been found particularly
useful for multiple influential points from the discussions. They are more effective
in detecting the outliers. If the measurement errors are normally distributed the
weighted least squares estimation works well due to its fast computational capabil-
ity and ability to reach global solution. On the lines of vulnerabilities discussed in
this chapter, the next chapter proposes a detection technique for identification of
gross error.
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Bad Data Identification against Lever-
age Point Attacks
This chapter presents the concept of robust generalized potentials and proposes
a technique to diagnose bad data and leverage measurements simultaneously from
the rest of the regression data. The power system state estimation measurement
equations in this context are regarded as linearized regression equations of state
variables at each operating point.
In other technology areas, the gross measurement errors have been treated as
outliers in factor space of linear regression analysis [64, 73].
However, sometimes some influential measurements called leverage points may
resemble outliers in factor space as they lie outside the regression line [27,74]. There-
fore, it is hard to identify errors in leverage points. As a result, it is necessary to
distinguish the leverage points from the outliers.
It has been reported that there are a number of ways one can identify the leverage
points from the diagonal elements of the hat matrix: Mahalanobis distance (MD)
of measurements, projection statistics (PS) [26, 27] etc.
Reference [60] has devised the concept of influence function as a combination of
influence of residuals and influence of position in factor space. Thus, looking at the
influence function one can identify bad data even for influential measurements.
The concept of finding outliers in multivariate data has been suggested in [73]
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and the concept of identifying outliers based on different residual diagnostics in linear
regression models of a system has been reported in other applications [64]. However,
they have not addressed the masking and swamping effect of leverage points when
there are multiple leverage points.
In the field of applied statistics, there has been research on identifying the mul-
tiple high leverage points in multivariate analysis. It has been pointed out that
due to the presence of more than one high leverage point, the leverage structure
may change in such a way that the leverage diagnostics for single leverage point
like twice-the-mean rule, thrice-the-mean rule, Cook’s distance, Welsch and Kuh’s
distance etc. will not be able to identify the real high leverage points.
Nurunnabi, Hadi and Imon in [63] have used a modified Cook’s distance and
Habshah, Norazan and Imon [62] have proposed a robust diagnostic potential to
address this issue. Reference [62] have applied the technique on Hawkins, Bradu and
Kass data and Brownlee’s stack loss data to illustrate the simultaneous identification
of outliers or erroneous data and high leverage points.
To the best of my knowledge, this methodology has never been applied in power
system bad data detection context. This chapter presents a robust bad data detec-
tion technique when the leverage measurements are compromised and shows that
it can take care of masking/swamping phenomenon in sparse systems like power
systems that existing methods cannot. This methodology is applied, for the first
time, to robustly detect bad data in regards to state estimation of power system.
The primary motivation of this chapter is driven by such possible scenarios when
the hacking of the data in meters is related to the measurements of the leverage
points. The next sections of this chapter propose the novel technique of identifying
gross error in those cases and has been tested on standard IEEE test networks.
5.1 Detection of Leverage and Bad data points
Leverage values are normally denoted as measures of influential observations in
the X-space. The X-space is the space of regressor variables. The hat matrix in
(4.2) gives a measure of the influence of a particular measurement. The ones which
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have higher influence are called high leverages and ones which have lower influence
are called low leverages. The twice-the-mean rule and thrice-the-mean rule on the
diagonal elements of the hat matrix have been reported in the literature to identify
the leverage points. Reference [63] has mentioned the Cook’s distance and Welsch
and Kuh’s distance to detect and identify the single leverage point. The Mahalanobis
distance based on the projection pursuit algorithm for minimum volume ellipsoid
cannot be applied to sparse systems. Since the electric power system is a sparse
system, the projection pursuit algorithm has to be modified in order to be applied
to the sparse power system. However, due to masking or swamping effect it becomes
difficult to identify the group of high leverage points.
5.2 Diagnostic robust generalized potentials
This technique, an adaptive approach to identify the group of leverage points,
is a unified approach of diagnostic and robust approaches. The robust approach
identifies the suspected high leverage points and the diagnostic approach confirms
the above suspicion. The robust approach identifies the leverage points by the
corresponding potentials of the data. The potential of a data is defined by Hadi [75]
as the diagonal element of the hat matrix with the ith data deleted. It is denoted by
potii = h
T
i (H
T
(i)H(i))
−1hi (5.1)
The points having a potential value more than the robust cut-off Median(potii) +
c.MAD(potii) is said to be a high leverage point, where,MAD is the median absolute
deviation from the median and c is a constant equal to 2 or 3. However, this method
is not robust against swamping. Habshah et al [62] have proposed a robust method to
identify high leverage points. The robust Mahalanobis distance (RMDi) is defined
as
RMDi =
√
[hi −Hc]T [C(H)]−1[hi −Hc] (5.2)
where, Hc is the mean of the l points for which determinant of the covariance
matrix (MCD) is minimum or Hc is the centre of the minimum volume ellipsoid
(MVE) covering these points, and C(H) is the corresponding covariance matrix.
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The cut-off value for a normal distributed multivariate data is
√
χ2n,α, but, for
general non-normal data the cut-off value as suggested in [62,66] is given by
Median(RMDi) + 3MAD(RMDi) (5.3)
The observations are grouped in two sets. Those which have robust Mahalanobis
distance greater than the cut-off as in Eq.(5.3) are considered to be in set D and
the rest in set R. The robust potentials for the observations in two sets are given as
pot∗ii =


K
−(D)
ii
1−K
−(D)
ii
∀ i ∈ R
K
−(D)
ii ∀ i ∈ D
(5.4)
K
−(D)
ii denotes the i
th diagonal element of the hat matrix with data as in set D
deleted. There exists no theoretical distribution for pot∗ii and hence, there is no
finite upper bound. However, [62, 66] suggested a suitable confidence bound type
cut-off like
Median(pot∗ii) + c.MAD(pot
∗
ii) (5.5)
The Mahalanobis distances of the multivariate data are first calculated. The Ma-
halanobis distance, however, is prone to the masking effect of multiple leverage
data points [31]. Fig. 5.1 shows the step-by-step procedure for the identification of
leverage points.
1. The robust Mahalanobis distances of the observations of the multi-variate data
are carried out based on minimum volume ellipsoid (MVE) or minimum covari-
ance determinant (MCD). Conceptually, MVE is the ellipsoid with minimum
volume that contains l data points. MCD is, however, the minimum of the
determinant of the covariance matrix which contains l points. l is typically
equal to [3m/2] + 1 (where 3m is the number of data points). MVE has been
considered here.
2. The multi-variate data are grouped into two separate subsets R and D. The
observations which have a distance higher than the cut-off as in (5.3) are
deleted from the main set and kept in a separate set called the deleted set D.
The rest of the data are kept as it is in a set called R.
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Calculate RMD based
on MVE or MCD
Form set R
and set D
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With ≤ cut off in
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Compute
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*
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*
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No
Figure 5.1: A flowchart showing the identification of leverage points
3. The generalized robust potentials for both the sets are computed.
4. If all the observations in the deleted set D have their generalized potentials
higher than the cut-off, then the leverage points are identified. If not, data
are put back to set R sequentially starting with the one which has the least
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generalized robust potential value.
5. The generalized potential values are recalculated with the new subsets.
6. This process continues till all the data in the set D have generalized potential
values more than the cut-off.
By this process, the masking and swamping effects, if present, are completely taken
care of and the high leverage and non-leverages are separated from each other.
5.3 Identification of gross error and high leverage
points
The measurements in a generic power system can be easily tampered with for
nefarious purposes. The physical meters in the system can be compromised by
introducing a large error by intelligent hackers. As discussed in Section 4.1, the
residuals as in (4.8) for leverage measurements are close to zero. The important
class of M-estimators, including the LAV estimator, cannot handle bad leverage
data points. Hence, it is very difficult to identify the gross error in case of leverage
measurements. Other estimators like LMS, LTS, RLS, Iterative RLS, BOFOLS etc.
are computationally intensive.
The residuals in the measurement data are functionally related to the leverage
values of the data. This method is a combination of direct and indirect approach
of multiple outlier detection. The low leverages and high leverages are separated
first based on DRGP and then generalized studentized residuals (GSR) is calculated
for the entire data set to identify the outliers. So, an outlier in set R will not be
confused with an outlier in set D. They are defined as
r∗st,i =


r
−(D)
i
σˆR−i
√
1−K
−(D)
ii
∀ i ∈ R
r
−(D)
i
σˆR
√
1+K
−(D)
ii
∀ i ∈ D
(5.6)
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where, σˆ2 is the least squares estimate of variance. r
−(D)
i represents the residual
of ith measurement with D data set deleted. R is the data set without the high
leverages.
The GSR is a form of a Student’s t-statistic with (3m − n − 3 − 1) degrees of
freedom and 97.5% detection confidence probability. One could, therefore, use a
t-table to get the exact cut-off values. But since the degrees of freedom are usually
quite large, the rule of thumb that absolute value of externally stuentized residuals is
greater than 3 is used [76]. The GSR is a type of an externally studentized residual.
This is a way of determining the ith residual except the ith observation. If the ith
observation is a serious outlier it may influence the least square function and may
influence to move it close to the ith observation. So, if it is removed, the ith residual
on the new model will indicate that this observation is an extreme value. The
mathematical background for the studentized residuals are given in Section 4.4.7 in
the previous chapter. All the observations for both the data sets are then plotted in
a DRGP-GSR plot. High leverage points are the points which have higher DRGP
values and bad data are those data which have higher GSR values. This leverage-
residual plot shows that most of the data will be clustered around the origin and the
masking/swamping effects do not come into picture. The DRGP-GSR plot clearly
separates and identifies the bad measurement data and high leverages. Even if high
leverage measurements are adulterated with gross errors the graphical plot clearly
identifies the measurement errors. Based on this concept, the next section shows
some case studies both for power transmission system and power distribution system
and thus justifies the effectiveness of the procedure.
5.4 Case Studies
The problem formulation shown in Section 2 is a three-phase formulation suitable
for generic distribution systems. However, the formulation for balanced transmission
systems can be taken as a special case of the above formulation, where, the number
of state variables and the number of equations as given in Chapter 3 are reduced
due to the balanced nature of the system. The voltage magnitudes and angles for a
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Figure 5.2: A schematic diagram of the DRGP-GSR plot
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particular bus will be the same for the three different phases. The proposed approach
has been performed on test systems: a small illustrative example, the IEEE 14-bus
system and the IEEE 123-bus distribution system. The algorithm was implemented
in MATLAB and run on a system with Intel Xeon processor @3.33 GHz and 12 GB
RAM.
5.4.1 Illustrative example
Figure 5.3 shows a basic four bus system with possible power injection and
branch power flow measurements. All branches are assumed to have a reactance of
j0.1 pu. The state variables of the system are considered as voltage magnitude and
voltage angles of buses. Since, there are four buses in the system altogether there are
eight state variables. However, the voltage angle for bus #1 is taken as the reference.
Table 5.1 presents the measurements for the given system. The system, currently,
has no leverage points. However, if the line between 1-2 is shortened by decreasing
the reactance to j0.01 pu, the measurements flow 1-2 and inj 1 become isolated
leverage points. An attacker can introduce a leverage point attack on the system
by tampering with the reactance of the line 1-2, should he/she wishes to attack inj
1 and/or flow 1-2. If the line 2-3 is shortened and the injection measurement is on
bus 1 instead of 3, the measurements flow 3-2 and inj 3 will become leverage points.
These two measurements become bad leverage points in the factor space. The
largest normalized residuals (LNR) method fails to identify these two bad leverage
points. It turns out from Table 5.1 that the generalized studentized residuals clearly
detects and identifies the bad measurements in case of leverage points. The value
of the studentized residual corresponding to the bad measurements with respect
to other measurements is much higher compared to that of the normalized residual
with respect to other measurements. Table 5.2 further shows the masking/swamping
effect of leverage points, if any. It also compares the leverage diagnostics of diagonal
elements of the hat matrix with the DRGP technique proposed in Section 5.2. It
depicts that while the leverage measure (diagonal element of the hat matrix) fails to
identify the leverage points due to masking/swamping effect the DRGP technique
can easily identify them. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 present the results for the active
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3
Figure 5.3: A 4-bus system for illustrative example
power injection and reactive power flow measurements when the line 2-3 is shortened.
Table 5.1: Real power measurements and residuals for the 4-bus system when line
1-2 is shortened
Measurement
type
Measurement
with no bad
data
Measurement
with bad
data
Normalized/
Internally
studentized
residuals
|GSR|
(2.228)
flow 1-2 1.50882 1.00892 0.550 2.578
flow 1-4 0.49119 0.49119 0.4793 0.4328
flow 2-4 0.33966 0.33966 0.2987 0.578
flow 3-2 -0.56915 -0.56915 1.2921 1.374
flow 3-4 -0.23084 -0.23084 0.2373 0.4328
flow 4-1 -0.49119 -0.49119 0.7821 0.8921
inj 1 2.00011 1.50011 0.3034 2.781
inj 3 -0.800 -0.800 0.5082 0.7811
inj 4 -0.600 -0.600 0.6821 0.852
5.4.2 IEEE 14-bus system
Figure 5.5 shows a typical IEEE 14-bus system. It is a typical meshed transmis-
sion network. The network parameters and load data are given in [77] and Appendix
C. There are five generation buses in the system. The loads are modelled as a com-
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Table 5.2: Leverage points and masking/swamping effect for real power measure-
ments when line 1-2 is shortened
Measurement
type
Masking or
Swamping
effect
Leverage
(0.726)
DRGP
(0.823)
Bad Data
flow 1-2 No 0.3172 0.8763 Yes
flow 1-4 No 0.2988 0.3126 No
flow 2-4 Yes 0.6309 0.4312 No
flow 3-2 No 0.3180 0.2182 No
flow 3-4 No 0.3257 0.5278 No
flow 4-1 No 0.5587 0.6721 No
inj 1 No 0.3272 0.8450 Yes
inj 3 No 0.2238 0.2994 No
inj 4 Yes 0.4592 0.2994 No
Table 5.3: Real power measurements and residuals for the 4-bus system when line
2-3 is shortened
Measurement
type
Measurement
with no bad
data
Measurement
with bad
data
Normalized/
Internally
studentized
residuals
|GSR|
(2.228)
flow 1-2 1.50882 1.50882 0.5813 0.1243
flow 1-4 0.49119 0.49119 0.5343 0.7923
flow 2-4 0.33966 0.33966 0.2453 1.265
flow 3-2 -0.56915 -0.17119 0.497 2.567
flow 3-4 -0.23084 -0.23084 1.2643 1.8809
flow 4-1 -0.49119 -0.49119 0.8702 0.811
inj 1 2.00011 2.00011 0.7982 0.1284
inj 3 -0.800 -0.400 0.530 2.879
inj 4 -0.600 -0.600 0.7033 0.4252
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Table 5.4: Leverage points and masking/swamping effect for real power measure-
ments when line 2-3 is shortened
Measurement
type
Masking or
Swamping
effect
Leverage
(0.726)
DRGP
(0.823)
Bad Data
flow 1-2 No 0.3810 0.4491 No
flow 1-4 No 0.3279 0.4318 No
flow 2-4 No 0.3692 0.3268 No
flow 3-2 Yes 0.6523 0.856 Yes
flow 3-4 No 0.5781 0.7284 No
flow 4-1 No 0.5432 0.3067 No
inj 1 Yes 0.4789 0.3104 No
inj 3 No 0.4872 0.894 Yes
inj 4 No 0.5890 0.4321 No
bination of constant impedance (Z), constant current (I) and constant power (P)
loads, which is known as the ZIP model. The measured variables are power injection
and branch power flows. The measurements are shown in Table 5.7. The measure-
ments are generated by adding random Gaussian noise to the single-phase load flow
results. he gross errors are generated by changing the value of the corresponding
diagonal element of the hat matrix Kii. The change in the Kii value reflects a change
in the corresponding measurement zi. The details are given in Appendix D.
The sample high and low leverage points are shown by arrow marks in Figure
5.4. In the figure, the line flow measurement flow 5-4 is a high leverage measurement.
To make a successful attack, the attacker makes changes to the impedance of the
branch 5-4 by applying Theorem 2 and rule 1 and rule 2.
The cut-off values for all the potential values and the studentized residuals are
shown in Table 5.7. It shows that DRGP correctly identifies the leverage data points
while the potential and the leverage values (i.e. diagonal entries of the hat matrix)
fails to identify the leverage measurements correctly and instead swamps some non-
leverage measurements as leverage and masks some leverage measurements as non-
leverage for 14-bus system. Table 5.6 justifies the fact, with some key measurements
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Figure 5.4: The sample high and low leverage points in IEEE-14 bus system
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shown with text arrows in Figure 5.7, 5.8, that DRGP technique with GSR properly
identifies the bad data for leverage measurements, however, the normalized residuals
fail to do so. Table 5.7 further shows the GSR of the measurements and thus,
validates the effectiveness of the strategy. Table 5.8 justifies the fact that DRGP is
robust against swamping or masking effect. While the robust Mahalanobis distance
masks some high leverage points as low leverages, the DRGP identifies all the high
leverages correctly. The above strategy is robust against the size of the system
and can be applied to larger standard systems such as IEEE-30 and IEEE-118 bus
system. The next subsection provides the results for a standard large but meshed
distribution 123-bus system.
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Figure 5.5: IEEE-14 bus system
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Table 5.5: Comparison of studentized residuals with other residuals for 14-bus sys-
tem
Measurement
Semi-
studentized
residuals
(2.3)
Internally
studentized
residuals
(3.0)
Externally
studentized
residuals
(3.0)
DFFITS
(1.782)
Cook’s
distance
(1.00)
flow 2-1 0.8864 0.8208 0.9445 0.4176 0.4279
flow 3-2 2.2952 1.4276 2.1169 0.6811 0.7892
flow 2-4 0.8099 0.9821 0.349 0.9031 0.1404
flow 1-5 0.4656 0.5793 1.5759 1.2042 0.4107
flow 5-2 2.9818 3.7311 2.0244 1.4321 0.1201
flow 5-4 2.7264 3.1437 5.4399 0.6478 0.4197
flow 5-6 1.7476 1.3681 0.3057 1.1573 0.1691
flow 4-7 0.8080 0.6435 1.9444 0.7921 0.3198
flow 8-7 0.6419 0.8092 1.2097 0.7695 0.4180
flow 9-7 1.0385 1.4952 0.4564 1.4502 0.3179
flow 9-10 0.1676 0.1280 0.4745 1.2998 0.0981
flow 6-11 0.7222 0.8211 1.1889 0.8931 .4193
flow 13-6 0.4754 0.1704 0.5142 1.672 0.1801
flow 10-11 0.7417 0.7411 1.0561 0.8701 0.3153
flow 13-14 1.5130 1.3711 1.3913 0.7982 0.3172
inj 1 1.6799 3.4143 6.0186 0.7921 0.8793
inj 4 0.3914 0.3719 4.3473 1.2983 0.9168
inj 8 0.6934 0.5489 0.9061 1.4042 0.9082
inj 10 0.5051 0.4301 0.3792 1.2763 0.4193
inj 12 0.0713 0.1032 0.0393 0.6822 .3812
inj 14 1.8547 1.432 2.0724 1.4731 0.8932
flow 1-2 2.0240 2.4191 2.0664 0.7291 0.8911
flow 5-1 1.6224 1.4522 1.5051 0.4321 0.7821
flow 4-3 1.8094 1.2480 2.3539 0.4126 0.1794
flow 7-8 1.6933 1.3421 2.1443 1.3279 0.7891
flow 9-4 0.3187 0.2819 1.1517 1.2792 0.6871
flow 10-9 0.1167 0.3179 0.057 0.9110 0.7981
flow 14-9 0.9419 0.3183 0.3926 0.2479 0.4729
Continued on next page
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Table 5.5: Continued from previous page...
Measurement
Semi-
studentized
residuals
(2.3)
Internally
studentized
residuals
(3.0)
Externally
studentized
residuals
(3.0)
DFFITS
(1.782)
Cook’s
distance
(1.00)
flow 13-12 0.2060 0.1261 1.3136 1.593 0.7911
inj 2 2.6871 0.4271 1.9129 0.495 0.4792
inj 6 0.2100 0.2721 2.3154 1.110 0.6871
inj 7 1.4043 1.3211 0.234 0.4729 0.8862
inj 11 0.4903 0.4302 0.1057 0.4380 0.6621
inj 13 0.7720 0.8711 1.342 0.1793 0.6911
Table 5.6: The GSR-DRGP approach and LNR approach
Measurement
Normalized
Residuals
Leverages
identified by
DRGP
GSR-DRGP Bad Data
flow 5-4 2.7264 Yes 5.4399 Yes
inj 4 0.3914 Yes 4.3473 Yes
flow 1-2 2.0240 Yes 2.0664 No
inj 2 2.6871 No 1.9129 No
inj 1 1.6799 No 6.0186 Yes
5.4.3 Distribution system
The IEEE 123-bus test distribution system has also been considered for this
study. The network parameters and load data are obtained from [51, 54]. The
topologies of the test systems are shown in Figure 5.6. The voltage level of the
system is 4.16 kV. There are both three-phase and single-phase loads. Thus, the
system is inherently unbalanced. The three-phase loads are either star or delta
connected. The loads are either constant current or constant impedance or constant
power. The loads in the system have been modelled as ZIP-model. The test system
consists of both overhead lines and underground cables. The overhead lines and
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underground cables have been modelled with modified Carson’s equations [49]. The
distribution feeder is either three-phase or three-phase with a grounded neutral
or single or two-phase laterals. Therefore, the impedance of each overhead line or
underground cable is represented as either a 3x3 or a 4x4 matrix compared to a single
element in single phase representation. However, the 4x4 matrix for three-phase lines
with grounded neutral is converted to 3x3 matrix by Kron’s reduction [49]. A three-
phase transformer is modelled as three individual single-phase transformers. The
tap changers are considered to have fixed taps. The switches between buses 14 and
117, 61 and 118, 19 and 116, 98 and 119 are considered closed.
The IEEE-123 test system has been modified to incorporate some leverage data
points in the measurement data set. Injection measurements are added on buses 14,
19 and 55 and the lines 9-14 and 19-22 are made short. The switches between buses
55 and 95 and 123 and 121 are closed. This makes the network meshed in nature.
The measurements are generated by adding random Gaussian noise to the three-
phase load flow results. The percentage error in real measurements is 3-5% and that
in pseudo measurements is 20%. The gross errors are generated by changing the
value of Kii as explained in Section 4.2. Appendix D states the details.
The main advantage of this method is that it can separate and simultaneously
identify the bad data points (outliers) and the leverages and, therefore, can be easily
applied to the measurement set even if the high leverages are affected by gross error.
These are reported here.
Table 5.7: Generalized potentials and studentized residuals for 14 bus system
Measurement
No.
Measurement
Leverage
(0.758)
DRGP
(0.927)
GSR(3.0)
1 flow 2-1 0.5907 0.0297 -0.9445
2 flow 3-2 0.1943 0.05 2.1169
3 flow 2-4 0.6339 0.3652 -0.349
4 flow 1-5 0.8152 0.0677 -1.5759
5 flow 5-2 0.6124 0.5727 2.0244
6 flow 5-4 (bad, high leverage) 0.2519 1.6442 5.4399
7 flow 5-6 0.23 0.5057 -0.3057
Continued on next page
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Table 5.7: Continued from previous page...
Measurement
No.
Measurement
Leverage
(0.758)
DRGP
(0.927)
GSR(3.0)
8 flow 4-7 0.0729 0.1049 -1.9444
9 flow 8-7 0.461 0.4617 -1.2097
10 flow 9-7 0.5467 0.363 -0.4564
11 flow 9-10 0.4373 0.6811 -0.4745
12 flow 6-11 0.3406 0.4543 -1.1889
13 flow 13-6 0.5156 0.5602 0.5142
14 flow 10-11 0.5181 0.3177 1.0561
15 flow 13-14 0.5432 0.3027 -1.3913
16 inj 1 (bad, low leverage) 0.7782 0.0777 6.0186
17 inj 4 (bad) 0.9065 0.9884 -4.3473
18 inj 8 0.1671 0.0932 -0.9061
19 inj 10 0.5674 0.1214 -0.3792
20 inj 12 0.189 0.2737 0.0393
21 inj 14 0.0955 0.582 -2.0724
22 flow 1-2 (good, high leverage) 0.8927 2.5896 2.0664
23 flow 5-1 0.3601 0.0423 1.5051
24 flow 4-3 0.367 0.2795 -2.3539
25 flow 7-8 0.5296 0.3688 2.1443
26 flow 9-4 0.6162 0.2918 1.1517
27 flow 10-9 0.2802 0.4598 -0.057
28 flow 14-9 0.5296 0.4396 0.3926
29 flow 13-12 0.3329 0.2044 -1.3136
30 inj 2 0.9115 0.9173 -1.9129
31 inj 6 0.6663 0.0108 2.3154
32 inj 7 0.2052 0.6888 0.234
33 inj 11 0.4908 0.117 0.1057
34 inj 13 0.4658 0.0744 -1.342
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Table 5.8: Masking or Swamping Effect for 14-bus system
Measurement
Identified by
RMD
Identified by
DRGP
Actual
leverages
Bad Data
flow 5-4 No Yes Yes Yes
inj 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
flow 1-2 Yes Yes Yes No
inj 2 No No No No
inj 1 Yes No No Yes
Table 5.9: DRGP and GSR for 123 bus system
Measurement
Leverage
(0.736)
DRGP
(0.853)
GSR(3.0) Bad Data
inj 55 0.854 1.7924 4.586 Yes
flow 54-55 0.756 1.8595 3.673 Yes
inj 14 0.675 0.9595 -4.457 Yes
flow 9-14 0.812 1.2595 2.0670 No
inj 67 0.478 0.5595 5.5465 Yes
inj 36 0.798 0.657 1.967 No
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Figure 5.6: IEEE 123-bus distribution system
5.5 Discussions
The DRGP vs GSR graphs for the 14 bus and 123 bus systems are shown in
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.10 respectively. The positions of high leverage points, low
leverage points, outliers on high leverage points and outliers on low leverage points
are shown clearly. The high leverages and the bad data points are shown in red in
the figures. As the bulk of the data are low leverages with low residuals, most of the
data points lie around the origin. The points with high leverages are located in the
upper area of the plot and the data points with large residuals lie either in the left or
right of the plot. This is explained in the schematic in Figure 5.2. The measurements
marked in red are highlighted in bold in Table 5.7. Table 5.9 shows the measurements
marked in red for 123-bus system. The high leverage measurement (flow 5-4 in 14-
bus system and inj 55 and flow 54-55 in 123-bus system) which contains gross error
are located at the top right corner of the graph. The low leverage (inj 1 in 14-bus
system and inj 67 in 123-bus system) with gross error is located at the extreme right
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end of the x − axis of the graph. The high leverages (flow 1-2 in 14-bus system
and flow 9-14 in 123-bus system) which are not contaminated with gross errors are
located at the top of the graph. Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.9 show the plot of the
leverage values (i.e. diagonal entries of the hat matrix) against the square of the
normalized residuals. The same cases shown in red in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.10
are shown in red here. However, here, the cases (inj 1, inj 2 and flow 1-5 in 14-bus
system and inj 14 in 123-bus system) are swamped and the case (flow 4-3 in 14-bus
system and inj 67 in 123-bus system) shows a large normalized residual. It is evident
from the figure that it is difficult to differentiate the outliers from the high leverage
points. Due to masking/swamping effect some measurements are misrepresented as
high leverages and vice versa. The key measurement points are shown with red data
points and text arrows in the Figures 5.7- 5.10.
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of GSR and normalized residuals of key measurements for
123-bus system
The above method has been applied to a small 4-bus example, balanced 14-bus
system and unbalanced IEEE 123-bus systems. The generalized studentized residual
has been used instead of the normalized residuals to identify the bad data. Even if
the normalized/internally studentized residuals are low the GSR for the false data
is significant. However, the above method has been compared with the normalized
residual test to identify bad data. Figure 5.8, 5.10 and Figure 5.7, 5.9 justify the
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effectiveness of the above algorithm. Table 5.5 compares the normalized/internally
studentized residuals and other measures with externally studentized residuals for
the 14-bus case, while Figure 5.11 shows the comparison of normalized residuals and
GSR for key measurements in case of 123-bus distribution system. From both cases
it can be inferred that while the largest normalized residual test fails to separate
the outliers from the high leverages and thus fails to identify the bad data when
there are multiple influential data points, the simultaneous technique of DRGP and
GSR clearly separates the high leverages, low leverages and measurement outliers
from one other and also prevents the masking or swamping effect in the presence of
multiple influential data points. Thus the method has the capability to deal with
deliberate man-made attack.
5.6 Conclusions
It is always necessary to detect erroneous measurements in active power net-
works. Due to growing deployment of ICT and automation technologies to operate
modern power systems the measurements can be tampered for mala fide intentions.
The attacker will always try to influence the states of the system by hiding the
attack from the detection algorithm, which is possible if the high leverage measure-
ments are especially targeted. The high leverages can occur in both transmission
and distribution networks.
The research reported here has used the concept of regression analysis to identify
the outliers and influential measurements in the system. It has been found that iden-
tifying the bad data for leverage measurements is particularly difficult due to the low
value of residuals even if they are infected with gross errors. In addition, if there are
multiple leverage measurements some of the high leverage measurement points may
be masked or swamped. Hence, in order to take care of this masking and swamping
effect, the concept of diagnostic-robust generalized potential has been proposed to
separate the leverage measurements from rest of the measurements and then the
studentized residuals are applied on the measurements to identify the bad data for
multiple high leverage measurements. Moreover, even if there are large errors in high
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leverage measurements it will be possible to identify them. Comprehensive results
and comparative studies on both transmission and distribution systems/balanced
and unbalanced systems further show the advantages of this methodology against
other existing residual techniques to identify bad data against leverage attack. The
proposed method can assist the EMS/DMS in taking control and operation decisions
in these scenarios.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Summary of thesis contributions
This chapter summarises the research contributions of this thesis and discusses
the insights gained from this research. The issues and challenges associated with
DSSE have been identified and addressed in detail. The vulnerabilities in regards
to state estimation and bad data detection in relation to leverage or influential
measurements have been explored and algorithms have been developed to address
these issues.
Due to the increasing automation and integration of ICT infrastructure in the
modern power system, there is an increasing need for visibility of system states.
Thus, state estimation has become an important function not only in transmission
level but also in distribution level. Due to the topological and structural character-
istics of the distribution system, it is inherently unbalanced. Over and above that,
a large portion of distribution system is unmetered/unmeasured. The observabil-
ity of the network is achieved by including pseudo measurements or loads in the
measurement set.
First of all, the different components of a three-phase unbalanced system such as
lines, transformers, loads and switches are modelled in detail. The difference between
distribution systems and transmission systems and the challenges related to unbal-
anced distribution system modelling are addressed. Due to their non-transposed
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nature distribution lines are modelled by Carson’s equation. Three-phase trans-
formers with different configurations will have different nodal admittance matrices.
The different types of loads with star and delta configurations are modelled by ZIP
models. Chapter 3 develops the WLS based state estimation algorithm for the full
three-phase network. The zero injection measurements and switches are considered
as equality constraints. The efficacy of the approach has been demonstrated by
applying on IEEE 13 bus and IEEE 123 bus systems. The state estimates are found
to vary with the percentage error in pseudo measurements. It has been shown that
the estimates are less accurate when the percentage errors are high. The chapter
further explores the suitability of the approach by changing the switch statuses of
the IEEE 123 bus system.
The exhaustive modelling of three-phase distribution systems can be applied in a
variety of power system applications and decision-making framework. It can be very
useful for not only state estimation but also in other applications such as transformer
tap estimation [43,45,78], bad data detection, security analysis [79], volt var control
[80] and active network management schemes in distribution systems [46,81].
The modern power network is undergoing a significant change. The smart in-
strumentation like phasor measurement units, intelligent metering, smart metering
etc. are making the network active and smart. The information and communication
infrastructure has become an integral part of the network. As a result, the security
and integrity of data is at stake. An attacker, who has knowledge of the network,
can exploit the vulnerabilities of the system by compromising the measurement me-
ters. In particular, the attacker can take advantage of the low residuals of leverage
measurement points to make the attack successful. The possible attack strategies
for this attack have been explored. Chapter 4 studies the vulnerabilities of the
network, both transmission and distribution, and further explains the suitability of
studentized residuals against the different residual and robust estimation techniques
for identification of bad data in relation to the leverage points.
The multiple leverages with inherently low residuals may also suffer from swamp-
ing or masking - a phenomenon where the low leverage point may appear to be high
and the high to be low. This makes the identification of gross errors even more
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difficult. Chapter 5 uses the concept of regression analysis to identify outliers and
influential points. It proposes a robust method of diagnostic robust generalized
potentials to identify the leverages. The methodology separates the high leverages
from non-leverages and then applies the generalized studentized residuals. This
completely nullifies the masking/swamping effects. The proposed method has been
applied on a small 4-bus example, the IEEE 14 bus system and IEEE 123 bus system
and the results justify the effectiveness of the approach. The above method can,
therefore, help the EMS/DMS to make control and operation decisions.
6.2 Future Work
Although the main issues associated with state estimation and bad data detec-
tion have been addressed in the thesis, future research directions will focus on the
following aspects of the problem:
• Tap positions play an important role in distribution system operation. An at-
tacker can inject gross error into the tap position measurements. The reactive
power flow through transformer will vary significantly when a tap measurement
is in error. The reactive power flow being on a short line has the possibility to be
a leverage measurement. Therefore, an extension of this work is to have a robust
detection technique for bad tap measurements which is under process.
• Another aspect of future research is to incorporate the correlations among loads
and correlation between loads and the real measurements, where the co-variance
matrix R will be non-diagonal.
• The future extension of this work will be developing a decentralised state es-
timation in micro-grid scenario. The topology of the distribution changes due
to interruptions, feeder maintenance etc. Most of the micro-grids have stand
alone generators to support the demand in them. The idea is to develop the
decentralised framework when those micro-grids are connected to the grid.
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IEEE 13-bus system data
Table A.1: Line configuration data
Configuration Type Phasing Phase Neutral Spacing
ACSR ACSR ID
601 overhead BACN 556,500 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
602 overhead CABN 4/0 6/1 4/0 6/1 500
603 overhead CBN 1/0 1/0 505
604 overhead ACN 1/0 1/0 505
605 overhead CN 1/0 1/0 510
606 underground ABCN
250,000 AA,
CN
None 515
607 underground AN 1/0 AA, TS 1/0 Cu 520
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Table A.2: Line segment data
Bus A Bus B Length(ft.) Configuration
4 3 500 603
4 5 500 602
5 6 0 XFM-1
3 2 300 603
1 4 2000 601
8 12 800 607
4 9 2000 601
9 8 300 604
9 13 1000 601
9 10 0 Switch
8 7 300 605
10 11 500 606
Table A.3: Transformer data
kVA kV (high) kV (low) R(%) X(%)
Substation 5000 115-∆ 4.16-Gr. Y 1 8
XFM-1 500 4.16-Gr. Y 0.48-Gr. Y 1.1 2
Table A.4: Capacitor data
Bus ph a ph b ph c
kVAr kVAr kVAr
11 200 200 200
7 - - 100
Total 200 200 300
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Table A.5: Regulator data
Regulator ID 1
Line segment 1-4
Location 50
Phases A-B-C
Connection 3-ph,LG
Monitoring phase A-B-C
Bandwidth 2 volts
PT ratio 20
Primary CT rating 700
Compensator settings ph a ph b ph c
R-setting 3 3 3
X-setting 9 9 9
Voltage level 122 122 122
Table A.6: Load data
Bus Load ph a ph a ph b ph b ph c ph c
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
6 Y-PQ 160 110 120 90 120 90
3 Y-PQ 0 0 170 125 0 0
2 ∆-Z 0 0 230 132 0 0
12 Y-Z 128 86 0 0 0 0
9 ∆-PQ 385 220 385 220 385 220
11 Y-PQ 485 190 68 60 290 212
10 ∆-I 0 0 0 0 170 151
7 Y-I 0 0 0 0 170 80
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IEEE 123-bus system data
Table B.1: Line configuration data
Configuration Type Phasing Phase Neutral Spacing
ACSR ACSR ID
1 overhead ABCN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
2 overhead CABN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
3 overhead BCAN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
4 overhead CBAN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
5 overhead BACN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
6 overhead ACBN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 500
7 overhead ACN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 505
8 overhead ABN 336,400 26/7 4/0 6/1 505
9 overhead AN 1/0 1/0 510
10 overhead BN 1/0 1/0 510
11 overhead CN 1/0 1/0 510
12 underground ABC 1/0 AA, CN 1/0 515
Table B.2: Line segment data
Bus A Bus B Length(ft.) Configuration
2 3 175 10
2 4 250 11
2 8 300 1
Continued on next page
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Table B.2: Line segment data
Bus A Bus B Length(ft.) Configuration
4 5 200 11
4 6 325 11
6 7 250 11
8 9 200 1
9 13 225 10
9 10 225 9
9 14 300 1
10 15 425 9
14 35 150 11
14 19 825 2
15 12 250 9
15 11 250 9
16 17 375 11
16 18 350 11
19 20 250 9
19 22 300 2
20 21 325 9
22 23 525 10
22 24 250 2
24 25 550 11
24 26 275 2
26 27 350 7
26 29 200 2
27 28 275 7
27 32 225 11
28 34 500 9
29 30 300 2
30 31 350 2
31 120 200 2
32 33 300 11
35 16 100 11
36 37 650 8
Continued on next page
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Table B.2: Line segment data
Bus A Bus B Length(ft.) Configuration
36 41 250 1
37 38 300 9
37 39 250 10
39 40 325 10
41 42 325 11
41 43 250 1
43 44 500 10
43 45 200 1
45 46 200 9
45 48 250 1
46 47 300 9
48 49 150 4
48 50 250 4
50 51 250 4
51 52 250 4
53 54 200 1
54 55 125 1
55 56 275 1
55 58 350 3
56 57 275 1
58 59 250 10
58 61 750 3
59 60 250 10
61 62 550 5
61 63 250 12
63 64 175 12
64 65 350 12
65 66 425 12
66 67 325 12
68 69 200 9
68 73 275 3
68 98 250 3
Continued on next page
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Table B.2: Line segment data
Bus A Bus B Length(ft.) Configuration
69 70 275 9
70 71 325 9
71 72 275 9
73 74 275 11
73 77 200 3
74 75 350 11
75 76 400 11
77 78 400 6
77 87 700 3
78 79 100 6
79 80 225 6
79 81 475 6
81 82 475 6
82 83 250 6
82 85 675 11
83 84 250 6
85 86 475 11
87 88 450 6
88 89 175 9
88 90 275 6
90 91 225 10
90 92 225 6
92 93 300 11
92 94 225 6
94 95 275 9
94 96 300 6
96 97 200 10
98 99 275 3
99 100 550 3
100 101 300 3
101 122 800 3
102 103 225 11
Continued on next page
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Table B.2: Line segment data
Bus A Bus B Length(ft.) Configuration
102 106 275 3
103 104 325 11
104 105 700 11
106 107 225 10
106 109 325 3
107 108 575 10
109 110 450 9
109 121 1000 3
110 111 300 9
111 112 575 9
111 113 125 9
113 114 525 9
114 115 325 9
116 36 375 4
1 2 400 1
117 53 400 1
118 68 350 6
119 102 250 3
14 117 0 Switch
19 116 0 Switch
61 118 0 Switch
98 119 0 Switch
Table B.3: Transformer data
kVA kV (high) kV (low) R(%) X(%)
Substation 5000 115-∆ 4.16-Gr. Y 1 8
XFM-1 150 4.16-Gr. Y 0.48-Gr. Y 1.27 2.72
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Table B.4: Three phase switches
Bus A Bus B Normal
14 117 closed
19 116 closed
61 118 closed
98 119 closed
55 95 open
123 121 open
Table B.5: Capacitor data
Bus ph a ph b ph c
kVAr kVAr kVAr
84 200 200 200
89 50 - -
91 - 50 -
93 - - 50
Total 250 250 250
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Table B.6: Regulator data
Regulator ID 1 Regulator ID 3
Line segment 1-2 Line segment 26-27
Location 1 Location 27
Phases A-B-C Phases A-C
Connection 3-ph,Y Connection
2-
ph,LG
Monitoring
phase
A
Monitoring
phase
A,C
Bandwidth 2 volts Bandwidth 1 volts
PT ratio 20 PT ratio 20
Primary CT rat-
ing
700
Primary CT rat-
ing
50
Compensator
settings
ph a
Compensator
settings
ph a ph c
R-setting 3 R-setting 0.4 0.4
X-setting 7.5 X-setting 0.4 0.4
Voltage level 120 Voltage level 120 120
Regulator ID 2 Regulator ID 4
Line segment 10-15 Line segment 118-68
Location 10 Location 68
Phases A Phases A-B-C
Connection
1-
ph,LG
Connection
3-
ph,LG
Monitoring
phase
A
Monitoring
phase
A,B,C
Bandwidth 2 volts Bandwidth 2 volts
PT ratio 20 PT ratio 20
Primary CT rat-
ing
50
Primary CT rat-
ing
300
Compensator
settings
ph a
Compensator
settings
ph a ph b ph c
R-setting 0.4 R-setting 0.6 1.4 0.2
X-setting 0.4 X-setting 1.3 2.6 1.4
Voltage level 120 Voltage level 124 124 124
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Table B.7: Load data
Bus Load ph a ph a ph b ph b ph c ph c
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
1 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
3 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
4 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
6 Y-I 0 0 0 0 20 10
7 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
8 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
9 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
11 Y-I 20 10 0 0 0 0
12 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
13 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
14 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
18 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
19 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
21 Y-I 40 20 0 0 0 0
22 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 Y-Z 0 0 40 20 0 0
24 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
26 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 Y-I 40 20 0 0 0 0
30 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
31 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
Continued on next page
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Table B.7: Load data
Bus Load ph a ph a ph b ph b ph c ph c
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
32 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
33 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
34 Y-I 40 20 0 0 0 0
35 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
36 D-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
37 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
39 Y-I 0 0 20 10 0 0
40 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
41 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
43 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
44 Y-Z 0 0 40 20 0 0
45 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
46 Y-I 20 10 0 0 0 0
47 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
48 Y-I 35 25 35 25 35 25
49 Y-Z 70 50 70 50 70 50
50 Y-PQ 35 25 70 50 35 25
51 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
52 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
53 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
54 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
55 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
56 Y-Z 20 10 0 0 0 0
57 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
58 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 Y-I 0 0 20 10 0 0
60 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
61 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
62 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Continued on next page
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Table B.7: Load data
Bus Load ph a ph a ph b ph b ph c ph c
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
63 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
64 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
65 Y-I 0 0 75 35 0 0
66 D-Z 35 25 35 25 70 50
67 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 75 35
68 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
70 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
71 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
72 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
73 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
74 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
75 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
76 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
77 D-I 105 80 70 50 70 50
78 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
79 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
81 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
82 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
84 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
85 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
86 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
87 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
88 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
89 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
90 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 Y-I 0 0 40 20 0 0
92 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
Continued on next page
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Table B.7: Load data
Bus Load ph a ph a ph b ph b ph c ph c
Model kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr
94 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
96 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
97 Y-PQ 0 0 20 10 0 0
98 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
100 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
101 Y-Z 0 0 0 0 40 20
102 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
103 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 20 10
104 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
105 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 40 20
106 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
107 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
108 Y-PQ 0 0 40 20 0 0
109 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 Y-PQ 40 20 0 0 0 0
111 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
112 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
113 Y-I 20 10 0 0 0 0
114 Y-Z 40 20 0 0 0 0
115 Y-PQ 20 10 0 0 0 0
116 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
117 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
118 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
119 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
121 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
122 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
123 Y-PQ 0 0 0 0 0 0
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IEEE 14-bus system data
Table C.1: Bus data
Active
load
Reactive
load
Active
generation
Reactive
generation
Bus kW kVAR kW kVAR
1 0 0 232.4 -16.9
2 21.7 12.7 40 42.4
3 94.2 19 0 23.4
4 47.8 -3.9 0 0
5 7.6 1.6 0 0
6 11.2 7.5 0 12.2
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 17.4
9 29.5 16.6 0 0
10 9 5.8 0 0
11 3.5 1.8 0 0
12 6.1 1.6 0 0
13 13.5 5.8 0 0
14 14.9 5 0 0
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Table C.2: Line data
From To R(pu) X(pu) B/2 Tap
1 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.0264 1
1 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.0246 1
2 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.0219 1
2 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.017 1
2 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.0173 1
3 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.0064 1
4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0 1
4 7 0 0.20912 0 0.978
4 9 0 0.55618 0 0.969
5 6 0 0.25202 0 0.932
6 11 0.09498 0.1989 0 1
6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0 1
6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0 1
7 8 0 0.17615 0 1
7 9 0 0.11001 0 1
9 10 0.03181 0.0845 0 1
9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0 1
10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0 1
12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0 1
13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0 1
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Theorems on Attack Strategy
Let, H¯ is defined as H¯ = R−1/2H, and H¯i is the i
th row of H¯
Theorem 1 : Let ǫ be the threshold and σ2i=1,...,3m be the variance of errors in the
J(xˆ) test. Given any set of measurements z, it is guaranteed to pass the J(xˆ) test
when
∑3m
i=1(1−Kii)
∑3m
j=1(z
2
j /σ
2
j ) ≤ ǫ.
Theorem 2 : Suppose the original set of measurements z can bypass the J(xˆ)
test. When the measurement zi in z is perturbed into z
attacked
i by the attacker, there
always exists a new value Kattackedii ∈ (Kii, 1], such that the new measurement set
zattacked is guaranteed to bypass the J(xˆ) test.
Theorem 3 : Let Kii be the i
th diagonal element of hat matrix K, then,
(1−Kii)2 ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥

H¯p
H¯f


∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2∥∥∥H¯Ti ∥∥∥2
2
where H¯ is partitioned as: H¯ =
[
H¯p
T
H¯i
T
H¯f
T
]T
.
An attacker can increase the value of Kii by just increasing the l2-norm of H¯Ti .
Since, H¯i = 1/σi.Hi, it gives rise to three rules
Rule 1: Increase the absolute values of elements in Hi.
Rule 2: Decrease the value of σi.
Rule 3: Increase the number of non-zero elements in Hi.
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The proofs of the theorems are given in [61].
Therefore, there is a relationship between the measurement zi and the correspond-
ing Kii. Let the attacked measurement be denoted by z
attacked
i and the attacked
corresponding diagonal element of the hat matrix be Kattackedii . Then, ∆Kii =
Kattackedii − Kii. Hence, the change in the value of Kii reflects a change in the
value of the corresponding zi.
A smaller σi indicates a higher accuracy measurement. A higher accuracy mea-
surement is more likely to become a leverage measurement and thus has a higher
chance of getting attacked. From Theorem 2, it is clear that a small change in
the value of Kii can make the attack successful against measurements with larger
value of Kii. Hence, the leverage measurements are more susceptible to successful
attacks.
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